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OWNING GERONIMO BUT NOT ELMER 
McCURDY: THE UNIQUE PROPERTY 
STATUS OF NATIVE AMERICAN REMAINS 
ALIX ROGERS* 
Abstract: This Article unifies two areas of legal scholarship that have not histor-
ically intersected. In the fields of biotechnology and the law, it is generally un-
derstood that human remains and many body parts are not objects of legal prop-
erty. This general rule has a startling exception, which heretofore has gone unno-
ticed in the literature and relevant case law. The bodily remains of Native Ameri-
cans were, and I argue, continue to be, objects of legal property. With the passage 
of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 
(“NAGPRA”) Native American remains are classified as familial and tribal prop-
erty. In Native American legal scholarship the distinction and significance of 
property status under NAGPRA has been overlooked. The perpetuation of prop-
erty status is surprising given that NAGPRA was passed to address the systemat-
ic disrespect for Native American burial grounds and commercialization of Na-
tive American remains. Property status is all the more striking and important be-
cause some federal circuits have also interpreted NAGPRA to apply to contem-
porary individuals with Native American ancestry. With the rise of genetic testing 
technologies, application of this property rule takes on some surprising implica-
tions. At first glance, we might condemn the property status of Native American 
remains as continued evidence of dehumanization. Property is traditionally associ-
ated with rights of alienability, exclusion, commensurability, and commodification. 
The understanding of property in Native American human remains advocated for in 
this paper challenges classic property constructs of wealth-maximization and an in-
dividually centered right of exclusion. Instead, after re-considering the paradigm of 
property, I argue that the communal property approach embodied by the Act ena-
bles Native Americans to protect their dead more effectively than any other Ameri-
can group. NAGPRA, therefore, represents an intriguing pathway for human bio-
logical materials regulation reform beyond Native American remains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of Native peoples by Western powers is replete with in-
stances of exploitation and dehumanization. This treatment extended beyond 
the lives of the living to the collection, display, and sale of the dead. The re-
mains of Native peoples from Australia, Canada, North America, and Hawaii 
are exhibited behind glass screens or lay tucked away on shelves in museums 
across the United States and around the world. Recent estimates of the number 
of Native American remains removed and held in private and public collec-
tions range from one hundred thousand to two million.1 Repatriation allows for 
these remains to be returned to the custody and care of contemporary descend-
ants and tribes. Global repatriation of human remains by Native peoples is not 
significant simply because bodies and parts are being returned. The status and 
repatriation of Native remains reflects the past treatment of Native people and 
their relationship to contemporary society. From a political perspective, human 
remains are powerful symbols of identity.2 In the United States, the remains of 
the Kennewick man, or Ancient one, have become a focal point for the broader 
recognition of Native American tribal rights and sovereignty.3 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(“NAGPRA” or the “Act”) was passed in 1990 to address the systematic disre-
spect for Native American burial grounds and the continued collection and dis-
play of Native American remains.4 The existing literature on Native American 
remains and NAGPRA has generally focused on the historical treatment of 
Native American remains and repatriation efforts.5 This paper argues that the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 369, 393 (1998). 
 2 See generally CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY (Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002). 
 3 See generally DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND 
THE BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY (2001). 
 4 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013 (2012). 
 5 See, e.g., ACCOMPLISHING NAGPRA (Sangita Chari & Jaime M.N. Lavalle eds., 2013); NA-
TIVE AMERICANS AND ARCHAEOLOGISTS: STEPPING STONES TO COMMON GROUND (Nina Swidler et 
al. eds., 1997); KATHLEEN SUE FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN REPATRIA-
TION MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 47 (2002) (recounting the history of the repatriation movement); 
Pemina Yellow Bird, Essay, NAGPRA at Twenty: A Report Card, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921 (2012); Roger 
Buffalohead, The History Behind the NMAI Act and NAGPRA, 1967–1990, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639 
(2012); Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing 
Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 437 (1986); Patty 
Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 
75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995); Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural 
Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723 (1997); Francis P. McManamon & Larry V. Norby, Implementing the Na-
tive American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 217 (1992); Angela R. Riley, 
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truly unique feature of Native American remains is that they were, and contin-
ue to be, legal property. Native American remains have evolved from individu-
al, to government, to now tribal property under NAGPRA. In sharp contrast, 
non-Native remains were, and generally continue to be, accorded non-property 
or quasi-property status.6 The legal status of Native American remains is there-
fore diametrically different from other human remains in American law. 
This legal distinction has been largely overlooked in the literature but has 
reverberating legal, social, and ethical implications. The unique status of Na-
tive American remains under NAGPRA is relevant to ongoing controversies 
over the status and repatriation of archaeologically significant remains. In 
2009, the lineal descendants of Geronimo brought a lawsuit to compel a Yale 
secret society, Skull and Bones, to return bodily remains of Geronimo that are 
rumored to be in the society’s possession.7 The University of California (UC) 
system also is embroiled in controversy over the repatriation of Native Ameri-
can remains. In 2014, the 9th Circuit decided a case that centered on the con-
troversial repatriation of two 9500-year-old skeletons discovered on the UC 
San Diego campus.8 Prompted in part by this case and the generally slow pace 
of repatriation by many of the UC schools, Governor Brown of California 
signed a bill in 2018 to accelerate the repatriation process across the UC sys-
tem.9 
The unique status of Native American remains is relevant not only to the 
treatment of older, historically significant remains, but also to the remains of 
the recently deceased. Federal circuits are divided on whether the Act’s lan-
guage of “human remains” as the “body of a person of Native American ances-
try” should be interpreted to apply to all Native American remains,10 or wheth-
                                                                                                                           
Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the Native American Graves Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (2002); Rennard Strickland, Imple-
menting the National Policy of Understanding, Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian 
Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 175 (1992); Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American History, Law 
and Culture, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Strickland, Things Not Spoken]. 
 6 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 367 (2000). 
Quasi-property is a common law conception composed of limited interests that mimic some of the 
functions of property. It operates more as a liability rule, so it does not have any criminal or constitu-
tional implications, like property. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, but Not Quite 
Property, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1889, 1891, 1916 (2012). Notably, theft is not applicable to quasi-
property. See id. at 1917–18. 
 7 In the case of the federal government, the plaintiffs argued possession because the gravesite was 
located on federal land. At minimum, the plaintiffs hoped to access the tomb to verify whether the 
body was intact or not. Geronimo v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 8 White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 9 Assemb. B. 2836 (Cal. 2018); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8026 (West 2019). 
 10 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1) (2015) (“Human remains means the physical remains of the body of a 
person of Native American ancestry. The term does not include remains or portions of remains that 
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er it should be restricted to only some, namely older, remains.11 Some circuits 
have adopted a plain reading of the Act and concluded that more contemporary 
remains of Native Americans are included in the definition of “human re-
mains.”12  
Consider the case of Jim Thorpe, a two-time gold medalist Native Ameri-
can, whose body was removed from a Sac and Fox ritual burial ceremony in 
1953 and buried in the new town of Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania.13 His children 
and the Sac and Fox Nation sued the town in 2010 under NAGPRA, demand-
ing the return of his remains.14 Although the tribe and the descendants were 
ultimately unsuccessful in repatriating the remains, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed that NAGPRA was applicable to Thorpe’s, decidedly non-
ancient, remains.15 
When this contemporary application interpretation is paired with this Ar-
ticle’s insight of property status, the implications are startling. They suggest 
that NAGPRA has far more sweeping effects than previously appreciated. The 
legal status of the remains of an individual who dies in 2019 could be depend-
ent upon whether they have Native American ancestry. With the increasing 
popularity of ancestral genetic testing, the coverage of NAGPRA becomes es-
pecially complicated. NAGPRA coverage is not contingent upon formal mem-
bership in a tribe. Rather, the government has held, and courts have followed,16 
that NAGPRA applies to the “body of a person of Native American ances-
try.”17 This broader interpretation of NAGPRA, therefore, has significant im-
plications for contemporary biomedical research. 
                                                                                                                           
may reasonably be determined to have been freely given or naturally shed by the individual from 
whose body they were obtained, such as hair made into ropes or nets. For the purposes of determining 
cultural affiliation, human remains incorporated into a funerary object, sacred object, or object of 
cultural patrimony, as defined below, must be considered as part of that item.”). 
 11 Compare Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
NAGPRA applies to Thorpe’s remains), and Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 83 
F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1060–61 (D.S.D. 2000) (holding that NAGPRA applies to a Native American 
cemetery), with Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (W.D. Tex. 
1999) (holding that NAGPRA does not apply to the remains of a recently deceased Native American). 
 12 “Defendants’ suggestion, in oral argument, that the Act applies only to prehistoric human re-
mains, cannot be accepted.” Yankton Sioux Tribe, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
 13 Erik Brady, Fight for Jim Thorpe’s Remains Continues 62 Years Later, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2015/08/08/jim-thorpe-pennsylvania-supreme-court-remains-nag
pra/31341409/ [https://perma.cc/5FKV-NLCR].  
 14 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 257. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 262. 
 17 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d) (“What objects are covered by these regulations? The Act covers four 
types of Native American objects. The term Native American means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, 
or culture indigenous to the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. (1) Human remains means 
the physical remains of the body of a person of Native American ancestry. The term does not include 
remains or portions of remains that may reasonably be determined to have been freely given or natu-
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At first glance, we might condemn the perpetuation of alternative legal 
statuses for the bodily remains of long dead, and potentially, recently departed 
Native Americans. NAGPRA was intended to heal wounds caused by hundreds 
of years of treating Native American remains differently from European re-
mains. It was designed “to ensure equal treatment of Native American re-
mains.”18 Contrasted with non-property status for other human remains, we 
might condemn the property status of Native American remains as continued 
evidence of dehumanization and commercialization.19 This is because property 
is traditionally associated with rights of alienability, exclusion, commensura-
bility, and commodification. The Anglo-American centric and traditional mod-
el of property is that “property rights identify a private owner who has title to a 
set of valued resources with a presumption of full power over those re-
sources.”20  
I argue that analysis of the appropriateness of property status for Native 
American remains requires deeper theoretical analysis about the structure and 
meaning of property itself. The understanding of property in Native American 
human remains advocated for in this paper challenges classic property con-
structs of wealth-maximization and an individually centered right of exclu-
sion.21 Instead, like other objects of cultural property, property in human re-
mains should transcend “classic legal concepts of markets, title, and alienabil-
ity that we often associate with ownership, [thereby] making it all the more 
important for property scholars to evaluate its parameters.”22 I argue that the 
communal property approach embodied by NAGPRA enables Native Ameri-
                                                                                                                           
rally shed by the individual from whose body they were obtained, such as hair made into ropes or 
nets. For the purposes of determining cultural affiliation, human remains incorporated into a funerary 
object, sacred object, or object of cultural patrimony, as defined below, must be considered as part of 
that item.”). Thus, the current controversy over Senator Elizabeth Warren’s DNA test claiming Native 
American ancestry takes on a particularly complex twist. Rebecca Brag & Eric Badner, Elizabeth 
Warren Releases DNA Test with ‘Strong Evidence’ of Native American Ancestry, CNN (Oct. 15, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/politics/elizabeth-warren-dna-test-native-american/index.
html [https://perma.cc/RA2E-LGJK]. 
 18 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 266 (quoting Amicus Br. of Nat’l Cong. of the Am. Indians, at 6–7, Thorpe 
v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-2446 & 13-2451), 2013 WL 
5869889). 
 19 Yet, as will be discussed, there are reasons to justify the persistence of differential treatment of 
Native Americans in American law. See generally Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferen-
tial” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002) (discussing Native American’s preferential treatment 
in American law). 
 20 Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNA-
TIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 4 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000). 
 21 Compare RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, at xi (1999) (“Property refers to the right 
of the owner or owners . . . to exploit assets to the exclusion of everyone else and dispose of them by 
sale or otherwise.”), with Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730 (1998) (calling the right of exclusion the “sine qua non” of property). 
 22 Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027 (2009). 
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cans to more effectively protect their dead compared to any other American 
group. Given the general lack of clarity and insufficient protections for all oth-
er human biological materials, NAGPRA represents an intriguing model for 
human biological materials regulation reform beyond Native American re-
mains. 
Part I explores America’s long and terrible history of expropriating and 
exploiting Native American remains.23 The existing literature on Native Amer-
ican remains shrouds their treatment in a language of exceptionalism.24 For 
example, Senator Daniel Inouye noted in discussion of NAGPRA that:  
When human remains are displayed in museums or historical socie-
ties, it is never the bones of white soldiers or the first European set-
tlers . . . . It is Indian remains. The message that this sends to the rest 
of the world is that Indians are culturally and physically different 
from and inferior to non-Indians.25  
This historical treatment prompted the passage of NAGPRA, and the authori-
zation of special protections for Native American remains. As shown in Part 
II,26 however, Native American remains were not as uniquely maltreated as the 
existing literature on NAGPRA might suggest. America has a long and grisly 
history of expropriating and displaying all human remains, particularly those 
that were deemed exotic or were from the lower classes.27 
This shared history of abuse does not diminish the pain nor justify the 
treatment of Native American communities. Native American remains and bur-
ial grounds were unquestionably systematically targeted on an unparalleled 
scale for a significantly longer period of time. This paper suggests, however, 
that the collection and display of human remains, while undeniably significant, 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See supra notes 31–61 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Echo-Hawk, supra note 5, at 448 (“If human remains and burial offerings of Native people 
are so easily desecrated and removed, wherever located, while the sanctity of the final resting place of 
other races is strictly protected, it is obvious that Native burial practices and associated beliefs were 
never considered during the development of the American law of property . . . .”). Importantly, under 
NAGPRA, Native American “means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to 
the United States.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). 
 25 136 CONG. REC. S17173, S17290 (1990). It is conceded, however, that “Congress found that 
both archeologists and federal property managers had ‘treated Native American human remains and 
funerary objects in a manner entirely different from the treatment of other human remains.’” Lannan, 
supra note 1, at 394 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 5 (1990)). Unearthed non-native remains tended 
to be studied and reburied, whereas many Native American remains were sent to museums to be held 
in collections indefinitely. H.R. REP. NO. 101-877, at 13 (1990); see also Strickland, Things Not Spo-
ken, supra note 5, at 11 (underscoring the importance of recognizing the relationship between indige-
nous populations and their homelands).  
 26 See supra notes 62–94 and accompanying text. 
 27 This, of course, does not excuse the horrific treatment, but it situates the practice in a broader 
context. 
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is not the most crucial or persistent legal distinction drawn between Native 
American and non-Native remains. The treatment and status of Native Ameri-
can remains in the past and today under NAGPRA are unique in other, previ-
ously overlooked, ways. The most important is the classification of Native 
American remains as objects of legal property. At common law and under most 
statutory regimes, non-Native human bodies and parts were, and are, not con-
sidered property. Moreover, American law follows an allocation system of 
rights of control and disposition of human remains that is centered on individ-
ual non-property rights. In contrast, there is a long history of classifying Native 
American remains as property. This status, I argue, is in part perpetuated under 
NAGPRA. Under the Act, many Native American remains are classified as 
objects of individual or tribal communal property. This Article argues that 
while property status before NAGPRA was dehumanizing and reflected nega-
tive underlying beliefs about Native Americans, such as otherness and com-
modification, under NAGPRA, property status can be empowering. This Arti-
cle remedies the oversight within the existing literature regarding the evolution 
and import of property status for Native American remains. 
Part III introduces NAGPRA and examines the sections of the Act that 
pertain to ownership.28 The property status of Native American remains has 
heretofore not been subject to legal analysis but has significant implications for 
human remains regulation. The import of this status becomes apparent when 
the wider context of human remains regulation is explored in Part IV. 
Part IV examines the four major legal mechanisms for protecting human 
remains generally: protections of graves and graveyards, criminalization, rights 
of disposition and control over dead bodies, and property rights.29 Comparison 
between Native American and non-Native remains demonstrates the historical 
and heightened vulnerability of Native American remains within the wider 
context of the weak and deeply flawed human remains regulation in America. 
It also reveals the distinctive advantages for Native Americans now under 
NAGPRA. 
The existence of divergent property statuses for Native and non-Native 
American remains should not necessarily, therefore, lead to condemnation of 
NAGPRA’s ownership provisions. As shown in Part V, human remains are ob-
jects whose physical existence and symbolic nature present particular chal-
lenges for our legal system.30 First, legal and social aversion to labeling human 
remains as property in America existed before the Declaration of Independ-
ence. Examination of the meaning and implications of treating human remains 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See supra notes 95–167 and accompanying text. 
 29 See supra notes 168–281 and accompanying text. 
 30 See supra notes 282–316 and accompanying text. 
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as non-property or property, however, suggests that we should not categorical-
ly oppose conceiving of human remains as property. Examination of founda-
tional property theory demonstrates the viability and utility of this approach. 
Second, exploration of communal property suggests that human remains, 
which almost always exist within a web of family relations, are particularly 
good candidates for communal property. Given that the common law, statutes, 
and law enforcement provide mediocre protection of human remains generally, 
we should consider that property status now enables Native Americans to pro-
tect their dead more effectively than any other American group. Therefore, de-
spite showing that Native American remains were subject to egregious acts as 
objects of property owned by individuals and the Government, and that a di-
vergent property status still persists, the current framework under NAGPRA 
confers far more substantive authority to Native Americans over related re-
mains compared to the protections available for non-Native remains. In fact, I 
argue that limited communal property is ripe for expanded application to all 
human remains, especially those that are not recently deceased. 
I. THE TREATMENT OF NATIVE AMERICAN REMAINS  
FROM EARLY AMERICA TO 1989 
Since their arrival in North America, early European Americans pursued 
ancient and contemporary Native American remains and artifacts in the name 
of science, history, and profit. One of the first exploration parties of the Plym-
outh Rock Pilgrims recounted how “we brought sundry of the prettiest things 
[from the burial pit] away with us, and covered up the corpse again.”31 Early 
American excavators and collectors encompassed all segments of society. 
Their ranks ranged from Thomas Jefferson, who excavated a Native American 
burial ground near his home,32 to profit-seeking operators of traveling exhibi-
tions and cabinets of curiosities. 
The popularity of the study of phrenology in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, in particular, spurred the collection of Native American 
remains.33 Samuel Morton, one of the founders of Physical Anthropology in 
America, sought to write an “American series (of craniology) . . . however, [he 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992) (citing DWIGHT B. 
HEATH, MOURT’S RELATION: A JOURNAL OF THE PILGRIMS AT PLYMOUTH 27–28 (1986)). 
 32 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 92–96 (Harper & Row, 1964) (1832); 
see also Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, Thomas Jefferson, Archaeologist, 47 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 161, 
162 (1943).  
 33 Phrenology is the study of the shape and size of individual’s head and facial shape with the 
intention of deducing character traits and mental abilities. See JOHN D. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD, 
AND SCIENCE: A 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN CRUSADE 3–4 (1971). 
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was] yet considerably deficient [in skulls], but . . . promised assistance from so 
many different sources.”34 Morton enlisted army officers and physicians to this 
end from across the country including Tennessee, Michigan, and South Caroli-
na.35 Both Morton and his collectors were fully aware of the sanctity of the 
remains for the living members of Native American tribes. In letters to Morton, 
his collectors chronicled the “rather perilous business”36 of procuring skulls. In 
CRANIA AMERICANA, published in 1839, Morton noted that “[t]he Indians have 
an extraordinary veneration for their dead, which sometimes induces them, on 
removing from one section of the country to another, to disinter the remains of 
their deceased relatives, and bear them to the new home of the tribe.”37 Despite 
this awareness, Morton and his contemporaries exhibited no signs of remorse 
or shame in their writings. The only concern expressed was to be careful to 
avoid detection by tribal members. 
Collection of Native American remains was not restricted to individual 
scientists and doctors, but was also undertaken by the government and muse-
ums. In fact, it was “[m]otivated in large part by Morton’s work, [that] the U.S. 
military began conducting craniometric studies on Native American skulls tak-
en from battlefields and graves to prove similar hypotheses [about the inferi-
ority of Native Americans].”38 As part of this study, “[i]n 1868, the Surgeon 
General ordered all U.S. Army field officers to send him Indian skulls so that 
studies could be performed comparing the sizes of Indian and white crania.”39 
Founded in 1862, the Army Medical Museum sought to “procure [a] sufficient-
ly large series of adult crania of the principal Indian tribes to furnish accurate 
average measurements.”40 The result of this official government policy was 
                                                                                                                           
 34 ROBERT E. BIEDER, A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN REMAINS 8 (1990) (quoting Letter from Samuel George Morton to John C. Warren (Feb. 27, 
1837)).  
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. at 10 (quoting Letter from Galiotti to Samuel George Morton (Dec. 27, 1841)). Further, 
in 1892, army surgeon Z.T. Daniel wrote a letter explaining how he procured skulls from the Black-
feet, recounting:  
I collected them in a way somewhat unusual: the burial place is in plain sight of many 
Indian houses and very near frequented roads. I had to visit the country at night when 
not even the dogs were stirring . . . . [T]he greatest fear I had was that some Indian 
would miss the heads, see my tracks & ambush me, but they didn’t.  
Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 31, at 41. 
 37 SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA 81 (1939). 
 38 Zoe E. Niesel, Better Late Than Never? The Effect of the Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act’s 2010 Regulations, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 841 (2011). 
 39 Lannan, supra note 1, at 393 (citing H.R. REP. 101-877, at 10 (1990)).  
 40 BIEDER, supra note 34, at 37 (citing DANIEL SMITH LAMB, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
MEDICAL MUSEUM: 1862–1917, at 51 (quoting Memorandum for the Information of Medical Officers 
(September 1, 1868))). 
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that “over 4,000 heads were taken from battlefields, burial grounds, POW 
camps, hospitals, fresh graves, and burial scaffolds across the country.”41 For 
example, the museum obtained the remains of those killed in the Sand Creek 
Massacre, wherein the Colorado militia killed 150 peaceful Cheyenne Indians 
in 1864.42 Between 1900 and 1904, most of the museum’s Native American 
remains were transferred to the Smithsonian Institution.43 Consequently, in 
1987, the Smithsonian Institution held one of the largest collections, pos-
sessing the remains of over 18,000 Native American individuals.44 
The collection of Native American remains was a lucrative trade. Franz 
Boas, known as the father of “American Anthropology,”45 reportedly paid his 
frontier grave robbers “$20 for a complete Indian skeleton and $5 for an Indian 
skull.”46 Museums were also willing to pay for collections of Indian bones. For 
example, in 1894 the Chicago Field Museum bought a collection of 238 re-
mains from Franz Boas.47 Moreover, human remains, particularly those of no-
table Native Americans, were sought after as valuable novelty objects. Native 
American bodies, both alive and dead, were popular attractions at traveling 
carnivals and world fairs. One such proprietor “shipped his fresh Indian arti-
fact collection to Chicago during the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition . . . 
[and] opened a 500-piece Indian relic sideshow . . . . The principal attraction: a 
dried Indian baby. . . . Thousands of curious people [sought] . . . to catch a 
glimpse of what the billboard called the ‘Mummified Indian Papoose, the 
Greatest Curiosity Ever on Exhibition.’”48 
Remains of well-known Native Americans were frequently pursued. One 
of the most infamous instances relates to the remains of Geronimo. Geronimo 
was a leader of the Apache tribe and a celebrated warrior during his lifetime. 
He died in 1909 and was buried at Fort Sill Indian Agency Cemetery, Oklaho-
ma.49 While they were posted at Fort Sill during World War I, six members of 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 31, at 40. 
 42 Russell Thornton, Repatriation as Healing the Wounds of the Trauma of History: Cases of 
Native Americans in the United States of America, in THE DEAD AND THEIR POSSESSIONS: REPATRI-
ATION IN PRINCIPLE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 17, 23 (Cressida Forde et al. eds., 2004). 
 43 Repatriation at the National Museum of Health and Medicine, NAT’L MUSEUM HEALTH & MED., 
http://www.medicalmuseum.mil/index.cfm?p=collections.anatomical.repatriation.index [https://perma.
cc/9DBL-4WMW]. 
 44 Lannan, supra note 1, at 393–94 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 1–2 (1990)). 
 45 See WILLIAM Y. ADAMS, THE BOASIANS: FOUNDING FATHERS AND MOTHERS OF AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGY 5 (2016). 
 46 BIEDER, supra note 34, at 31. To provide context, $20 in 1894 is equivalent to around $500 in 
2012. 
 47 Id. 
 48 FINE-DARE, supra note 5, at 47 (citing RENÉE SANSOM FLOOD, LOST BIRD OF WOUNDED 
KNEE 53–54 (1998)). 
 49 Complaint at 1, ¶ 47, Geronimo v. Obama, 725 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-
00303), 2009 WL 455211. 
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the Skull and Bones secret society, including Prescott Bush, grandfather of 
President George W. Bush, supposedly dug up Geronimo’s grave and sent a 
skull back to New Haven. The rumor has never been proven true, although ar-
chival evidence indicates that at minimum the group procured bones they 
thought were from Geronimo’s grave and sent them to New Haven.50 In 2009, 
the lineal descendants of Geronimo brought a lawsuit to compel Skull and 
Bones and the Federal Government to return any remains in their possession.51 
As will be discussed later in this paper’s section on NAGPRA, the suit was 
dismissed. The fate of Geronimo’s body remains a mystery to this day.52 
The treatment of Native American remains as curiosities and collectables 
persisted well into the 1980s and continues today. Estimates of Native American 
remains held in private and public collections range from one hundred thousand 
to two million.53 Often the remains of one individual can be divided between 
several institutions. The Northern Cheyenne tribe, for instance, discovered upon 
repatriation a match between the lower part of a skull held by Harvard and the 
upper part of a skull held by the Smithsonian.54 As will be seen, under 
NAGPRA, contemporary monetary transactions of Native American remains are 
largely forbidden, but they still occur on the black market or internationally. In 
2016, a French auction house sold numerous Native American ceremonial items 
including a shirt made from human scalps and hair.55 No discoverable convic-
tions for the sale of human remains have occurred under NAGPRA,56 although 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Ishaan Tharoor, Top 10 Famous Stolen Body Parts, TIME (May 10, 2011), http://content.
time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1988719_1988728_1988723,00.html [https://perma.
cc/3CG7-7XVQ]. 
 51 In the case of the Federal Government the plaintiffs argued possession because the gravesite 
was located on federal land. At minimum, the plaintiffs hoped to access the tomb to verify whether the 
body was intact or not. Complaint ¶ 47, Geronimo, 2009 WL 455211.  
 52 Tharoor, supra note 50. As an aside, it is worth noting that other rumors of actual human bones 
used by the society have proven true. In 2010, the auction company Christie’s planned to auction off a 
19th century Skull and Bones ballot box comprised of a human skull and crossbones. The item was 
ultimately withdrawn from auction after a title dispute. Christie’s Drops Human Skull from Auction, 
CNN (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/01/22/new.york.skull.auction/index.html [https://
perma.cc/SM37-ZHZM]. 
 53 Lannan, supra note 1, at 393. 
 54 Thornton, supra note 42, at 17. 
 55 Camila Domonoske, Native American Protest a Planned Auction of Sacred Objects in France, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/25/479455
188/native-americans-protest-planned-auction-of-sacred-objects-in-france [https://perma.cc/52VH-
G4TC]; Vest De ‘Guerrier’ Ou Aux ‘Scalps Probablement . . . [Warrior Vest, Probably of Scalps . . .], 
AUCTION EVE, http://www.auctio-eve.com/html/fiche.jsp?id=6016987&np=1&lng=fr&npp=10000&
ordre=&aff=&r=&sold=&&setLng=en [https://perma.cc/4SBN-9B6J].  
 56 This is not the case for other cultural items such as objects of cultural patrimony. There have 
been numerous instances of these convictions. See generally United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 
(9th Cir. 1999) (masks and robes); United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1999) (prayer 
sticks and sun disk); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997) (headdresses and feath-
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in 2001, in United States v. Ugo G. DeLuca,57 the government prosecuted an an-
tiques seller for attempting to sell Native American skull fragments. The case 
seems to have eventually settled, however, as there is no record of a conviction. 
In addition, disrespect for Native American burial grounds continues into the 
modern era. In 1979, for example, 200 Miwok tribal graves were emptied and 
the land bulldozed in California to construct a residential tract over the protests 
of living Miwok descendants.58 Similarly, in March 1989 National Geographic 
magazine published a report that detailed the recent desecration of over 650 Na-
tive American graves by contemporary relic hunters.59 
In recognition of the injustices committed, the need to repatriate remains 
held by institutions, and to protect in situ remains,60 Congress passed 
NAGPRA. The Act is discussed in more detail in Part III, but at this stage it is 
important to note that it was passed in response to the particular and egregious 
treatment of Native American remains and cultural objects. Florida Congress-
man Charles E. Bennett, who introduced NAGPRA, stated that he was 
prompted to introduce this legislation after reading the 1989 National Geo-
graphic article. He stated, “I [was] outraged by [t]his immoral and indecent 
treatment of the dead.”61 Without trivializing the experiences of Native Ameri-
cans and the horrific treatment of Native American remains, Part II introduces 
the corresponding exploitation of non-Native remains. Native American re-
mains were systematically collected and burial grounds were desecrated to an 
unparalleled degree and often with the full force of the United States govern-
ment. Yet, the practice was part of a larger context that is relevant to later dis-
cussion of the disjunctive property status of non-Native and Native remains. 
II. THE TREATMENT OF NON-NATIVE HUMAN REMAINS IN AMERICA 
Across America, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
non-Native bodies and parts were also actively collected, traded, and dis-
played. The macabre fate of Elmer McCurdy is a noteworthy example.62 Elmer 
                                                                                                                           
ers); State v. Taylor, 269 P.3d 740 (Haw. 2011) (wooden Native Hawaiian artifacts, state case pertain-
ing to an earlier federal case that ended with a guilty plea deal). 
 57 United States v. DeLuca, No. 00 CR 387, 2001 WL 1654770, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2001). 
 58 Wana the Bear v. Cmty. Const., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424 (Ct. App. 1982). The plaintiff 
sought criminal enforcement under California Health and Safety Code § 7052, which criminalized the 
disinterment of human remains without legal permission. Id. at 425.  
 59 See Harvey Arden, Who Owns Our Past?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1989, at 376. 
 60 In situ means something that is in its natural position. 
 61 Protection of Native American Graves and the Repatriation of Human Remains and Sacred 
Objects: Hearings on H.R. 1381, H.R. 1646, and H.R. 5237 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 101st Cong. 130 (1990) (statement of Representative Bennett). 
 62 See generally MARK SVENVOLD, ELMER MCCURDY: THE LIFE AND AFTERLIFE OF AN AMERI-
CAN OUTLAW (2002); Ella Morton, How a Real Corpse Ended Up in a California Fun Park Spook-
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was a Caucasian small-time outlaw killed in Oklahoma by authorities after a 
failed train robbery in 1911.63 His body was taken to a funeral home and em-
balmed. No one claimed the body for several years, however, and the owner of 
the funeral home displayed the body as both an advertisement of his services 
and a curiosity for visitors. Thereafter, Elmer’s remains became a popular trav-
eling carnival exhibit and movie prop. Overtime, the identity of the corpse was 
forgotten, and people assumed the body was a wax figure. It was not until 
1976, while on movie set, that a film crew realized the remains were real. In 
1977, the body was formally buried in Oklahoma, with approximately six feet 
of concrete over it to ensure it was not disturbed.64 Elmer’s story is clearly a 
remarkable one, but not as unusual as one might think. Dubious collection 
practices of all types of remains were fixtures of mainstream science and med-
icine in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. 
A. Collecting in the Name of Science 
Early American scientists and museums were not exclusively interested in 
collecting and cataloguing Native American remains. Samuel Morton also cat-
egorized European, Asian, and African skulls. Importantly, the Army Medical 
Museum, described above, which collected Native American crania, was 
founded during the Civil War to catalogue human body parts with injuries of 
particular medical interest. Field surgeons throughout the country were re-
quested to submit preserved specimens that might be of instructional value. 
Surgeons were eager to learn and compliance was common.65 Unlike the case 
with Native Americans, however, nationalism and duty played an important 
role. For example, the curator of the collection, Dr. John Brinton, was able to 
convince the objecting friends of a fallen soldier who had a “remarkable inju-
ry” of the “glory of a patriot having part of his body . . . under the special 
guard of his country.”66 While it seems that no requirements for consent of in-
dividuals or relatives were implemented, the above example does suggest that 
a greater degree of consideration was given to the acquisition of non-Native 
remains compared to Native remains. After the war, the displays at the Army 
                                                                                                                           
house, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/atlas_obscura/2014/04/11/the_corpse_of_
elmer_mccurdy_and_how_it_ended_up_in_a_long_beach_fun_park.html [https://perma.cc/SA9L-
RP76]. 
 63 SVENVOLD, supra note 62, at 100, 113–17; see also Steve Harvey, Inept Train Robber Had an 
Unimpressive Life but a Celebrated Afterlife, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2011), https://www.latimes.com/
local/la-xpm-2011-jul-03-la-me-0703-then-20110703-story.html [https://perma.cc/CJW8-DGL2]. 
 64 SVENFOLD, supra note 62, at 256. 
 65 GARY LADERMAN, THE SACRED REMAINS: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH 1799–
1883, at 146 (1996). 
 66 Id. at 146–47. 
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Medical Museum became a popular attraction to the public. Further, as if 
straight out of a Dickens’ novel, it was noted by curators that “maimed soldiers 
also visited the museum, often in search of missing limbs.”67 
The Army Medical Museum was not an outlier; established doctors and 
institutions across the country collected non-Native human specimens. One of 
the oldest and most extensive collections remains open to visitors in the mod-
ern day. The College of Physicians of Philadelphia operates the Mutter Muse-
um, which was founded in 1858. The museum houses a collection that includes 
roughly 5,000 remains.68 The collection ranges from the Soap Lady, whose 
adipocere body was unearthed in the old city area of Philadelphia in 1875,69 to 
the conjoined liver of the original Siamese twins Cheng and Eng, to a tumor 
removed from President Grover Cleveland. Not all of the collections are from 
remarkable or famous bodies. For instance, the museum has a collection of 139 
largely European skulls known as the Hyrtl Collection.70 
In general, most museums collected the bodies of the “monstrous” or the 
“marvelous.” Consequently, in relation to Native American remains, it was not 
only that Native bodies were collected without consent, but also that the act of 
collection often implied a definition of Native bodies as different or other. The 
definition of Native bodies as different bodies is particularly salient in the con-
text of more popular displays of human bodies and parts in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century America. As mentioned above, Native American bodies, 
both alive and dead, were offered as entertainment to the public at world fairs 
and traveling shows. Similarly, exotic bodies, such as those of African pyg-
mies, and marvelous bodies, such as those of dwarfs, were displayed for pay-
ing audiences. Therefore, two additional components of the collection and dis-
play of human remains emerged: marginalization (for both the deceased indi-
vidual and for family members) and commercialization. Those bodies deemed 
by mainstream society as within the sphere of “other” were more readily disen-
franchised and commercialized. These bodies included Native Americans, but 
also encompassed African Americans, Europeans with physical abnormalities, 
and the poor. 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 147. 
 68 E-mail correspondence with Anna N. Dhody, Curator of the Mutter Museum (Dec. 20, 2012) 
(on file with author). 
 69 Edward Colimore, Learning Secrets of the ‘Soap Lady,’ PHILA. INQUIRER (May 17, 2008), 
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B. Collecting in the Name of Medicine 
Nowhere is the story of marginalization and commercialization in early 
America more poignant than in the history of medical dissection. Before and 
after the Civil War, grave robbers targeted the remains of poor whites and Afri-
can Americans, in particular, to provide corpses for medical dissection. Alt-
hough illegal, individuals and authorities often turned a blind eye to grave rob-
bing, particularly with regards to the graveyards of the lower classes. This was 
especially true for “potter’s fields,” where bodies were buried at public ex-
pense.71 One sad example, recorded by David Humphrey, describes an incident 
in Philadelphia in 1845 wherein the inmates of the local almshouse petitioned 
the board to prevent the robbing of bodies from the almshouse graveyard. The 
board replied that “‘the [medical] colleges must have subjects’ and should 
grave robbers be barred from the almshouse they would plunder church ceme-
teries and other private burial grounds.”72 Thus, Americans of all classes 
adopted various measures, such as patented metal coffins, to protect their dead 
against the “ravages of t[h]e dissecting knife,”73 but the poor had few political, 
social, and economic resources to protect their deceased. Thus, most corpses 
used for medical purposes came from the poor or the unknown dead.74 
The economic stratification of body snatching was prevalent, but race was 
also a factor in selection. Prior to the Civil War, slave owners could sell slaves 
to researchers or medical schools for experiments or dissection.75 Given the 
value of a living slave at the time, it was very unlikely anyone was sold and 
killed for dissection, but it was certainly the case that African Americans, par-
ticularly in the South, were mainstays of dissection halls. In 1835, for example, 
one traveler commented on how “[i]n Baltimore the bodies of coloured people 
are exclusively taken for dissection.”76 One medical school went even so far as 
to purchase a slave who was tasked with procuring African American and poor 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Frederick C. Waite, Grave Robbing in New England, 33 BULL. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 272, 279 
(1945). 
 72 David C. Humphrey, Dissection and Discrimination: The Social Origins of Cadavers in Ameri-
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 74 Humphrey, supra note 72, at 819. 
 75 See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF 
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(2008). 
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140 (1838)). 
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white cadavers.77 Further north, where there were fewer slaves, some medical 
schools made arrangements for bodies, hidden in barrels, to be shipped from 
the South.78 The overrepresentation of African Americans continued into the 
post-Civil War era, when black cemeteries were far more frequently targeted 
for raiding than white cemeteries.79 
In 1854, New York State passed a law to curtail grave robbing,80 widely 
known as the Bone Bill.81 Prior to the passage of the bill, between 600 and 700 
graves were illicitly emptied annually in New York City.82 The law is one of 
the earliest instances of dissection legislation in the United States,83 and paral-
leled England’s 1832 Anatomy Act.84 Under the New York law, the bodies of 
those who died in poorhouses or prisons became available to medical 
schools.85 Efforts to pass anatomy acts in most states faltered during the pre-
Civil War period, “[o]f five anatomy laws enacted before 1860, three were re-
pealed.”86 By the early 1880s, fourteen of the thirty-eight states had passed 
similar laws,87 and by 1913, “of the 39 states with medical schools, Alabama 
and Louisiana still lacked anatomy laws, and North Carolina and Tennessee 
made only the bodies of deceased criminals legally available.”88  
While the passage of these acts helped protect the sanctity of the buried 
dead by providing a legally accessible supply of corpses for medical schools, 
in many cases this meant that instead of having to dig up a body from a pot-
ter’s field, the deceased would be delivered directly to a medical school. Laws 
that permitted the allocation of unknown and unclaimed corpses in morgues to 
medical schools persist today. New York only modified its practice of making 
unclaimed and insolvent dead bodies available for medical research and educa-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Tanya Telfair Sharpe, Grandison Harris: The Medical College of Georgia’s Resurrection Man, 
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American. SAPPOL, supra note 79, at 329 n.6. 
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tion in 2016.89 Although no exact data seems to exist, it is most likely that the 
bodies of minorities and the poor continue to be overrepresented on dissection 
tables. Studies have found, for instance, that high funeral costs disproportion-
ately impact racial minorities.90 
Bodies taken for dissection were not only removed, dissected, and fre-
quently retained, but also, like Native American remains, they became com-
mercialized objects bought and sold through the market. In A TALE OF TWO 
CITIES, Jerry Cruncher made extra money as a resurrection man selling corpses 
to medical schools. Although it may seem difficult to move from fictional ex-
amples to actual records of legal cases,91 one Tennessee case from 1900, 
Thompson v. State,92 records how E.D. Thompson, the county undertaker, and 
Frank Thompson were convicted after attempting to sell the body of a pauper, 
Jennie McGuire, for $50.93 Shockingly, the defendants were only charged for 
the taking of the white female corpse even though they were also apprehended 
with the bodies of three African Americans. 
The forgotten bodies of the three unnamed African Americans illustrate 
that it was not only Native people who were disenfranchised and commercial-
ized in death. While it must be acknowledged that Native American remains, 
as illustrated by the 1989 National Geographic article, continued to be fre-
quently expropriated and displayed without consent well into the twentieth 
century,94 this section aims to illustrate that, contrary to much of the existing 
NAGPRA literature, the historical collection and display of Native American 
remains was part of a broader social context of collection and display of hu-
man remains, particularly of those deemed to be “other.” Proceeding from the 
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historical treatment to the legal status in Parts III and IV, it becomes clear that 
what is significant about the treatment and status of Native American remains 
is not simply that they were taken or displayed. Rather, as will be shown, it 
was, and is, their status as objects of legal property. This status was perpetuat-
ed under NAGPRA, which was passed in 1990 to enable the protection of in situ 
Native remains on federal lands by Native peoples, to prevent the trade and dis-
play of Native remains, and to facilitate the return and burial of remains residing 
in federally sponsored collections across the country. The next section introduces 
NAGPRA and specifically discusses the property provisions of the Act. 
III. THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION  
AND REPATRIATION ACT 
In the 1960s, awareness increased about the existence of collections of 
Native American remains and objects, along with a broader reclaiming of cul-
tural rights. Native American peoples and tribes began to fight to repatriate 
remains and objects held by institutions.95 These efforts culminated with the 
passage of NAGPRA.96 The result of detailed hearings and negotiations among 
tribal leaders, historians, archaeologists, and museums, NAGPRA dramatically 
changed the obligations of federally funded institutions to Native Americans 
and Native Hawaiians. Courts have interpreted NAGPRA as having two main 
objectives:  
[F]irst, to protect Native American burial sites and to require exca-
vation of such sites only by permit, and second, to set up a process 
by which federal agencies and museums holding Native American 
remains and cultural artifacts will inventory those items and work 
with tribes to repatriate them.97  
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 97 Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (W.D. Tex. 1999).  
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NAGPRA recognized that Native Americans and Native Hawaiians have the 
right to receive information about, and ultimately repatriate, cultural items to 
which they are culturally affiliated. The Act represented a reversal of decades 
of federal government policies aimed at collecting and displaying the remains 
and cultural objects of Native American and Native Hawaiians. Notably for 
this paper, it created special categories, obligations, and rights to Native Amer-
ican and Native Hawaiian remains that have no legal analog for non-Native 
human remains. 
As of September 2016, NAGPRA has provided a pathway for the repat-
riation of the remains of 57,847 individuals held in institutions and museums 
across the country.98 Additionally, NAGPRA’s impact has extended beyond the 
federally funded institutions it regulates. Some states, like California, have 
passed similar state-level legislation.99 Implementation has varied across states 
and institutions. Within California, the University of California, Los Angeles 
has returned nearly all of the 2,300 remains it had in its collection.100 In con-
trast, in 2018, at the University of California, Berkeley’s Phoebe Hearst Muse-
um, “which holds one of the largest collections of human remains in the coun-
try, fewer than 300 bodies have been returned out of more than 9,000.”101 
Prompted in part by the generally slow pace of repatriation by many of the 
University of California schools, Governor Brown of California signed a bill in 
2018 to speed the repatriation process across the University of California sys-
tem.102 The Act has had a cultural impact on institutions and collectors that are 
not legally subject to its requirements. These groups are now under significant 
social and moral pressure to repatriate remains and objects. Consequently, Na-
tive Americans and Native Hawaiians have successfully repatriated remains 
and objects from independent or international institutions and individuals not 
subject to NAGPRA.103 The next sub-sections briefly outline some of the key 
property related features of NAGPRA. 
                                                                                                                           
 98 National NAGPRA Frequently Asked Questions, U.S DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.nps.gov/
nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.HTM#Grant [https://perma.cc/3BZ5-V7J9]. 
 99 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 8010–8029 (West 2019) (requiring repatriation of Na-
tive American remains held by state institutions and agencies). 
 100 Felecia Mello, Native American Tribes Clash with UC Over Bones of Their Ancestors, KQED 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11680078/native-american-tribes-clash-with-uc-over-bones-
of-their-ancestors [https://perma.cc/M5Z5-M2MV]. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Assemb. B. 2836 (Cal. 2018); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8026.  
 103 The Annenberg Foundation, for example, purchased many of the sacred items sold at the auc-
tion in Paris in order to repatriate them. Alexandria Sage, U.S. Foundation Buys Hopi Masks at Auc-
tion to Return to Tribe, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-auction-
idUSBRE9B80QJ20131211 [https://perma.cc/MWN2-LR56].  
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A. Federal or Tribal Land & Federal Institutions 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act applies to 
all “cultural items which are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands 
after November 16, 1990.”104 Native American burial sites, as was shown 
above, were frequent targets for relic hunters and grave robbers. Moreover, as 
will be seen in Part IV, Native American burial sites were infrequently accord-
ed the same statutory and common law protections that pertain to cemeteries or 
other burial sites. Under NAGPRA, intentional excavation of Native American 
remains or objects from federal lands can only occur after consultation with 
the appropriate tribe and the issuance of a permit by the federal government.105 
Additionally, remains located on tribal lands can only be excavated with the 
consent of the relevant tribe.106 Remains that are inadvertently discovered are 
also subject to reporting and consultation requirements.107 
The Act also applies to all cultural items that are within the possession or 
control of a federal agency or museum that receives federal funding.108 
NAGPRA mandates that these organizations comply with consultation,109 in-
ventory,110 and repatriation requirements.111 The language of NAGPRA implies 
that these requirements apply to not only cultural items within the institution’s 
possession or control before 1990, but also to any later acquisitions. 
The breadth of the definition of “museum” has proven legally conten-
tious. Under Department of the Interior guidelines, “museum” is very broadly 
defined as “any institution or State or local government agency (including any 
institution of higher learning) that has possession of, or control over, human 
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony and 
receives Federal funds.”112 The case involving the remains of Native American 
athlete Jim Thorpe, discussed above, turned on the definition of “museum.” In 
1953, his body was removed from a Sac and Fox Nation Reservation in Okla-
homa during a ritual burial ceremony. Instead of being buried in Oklahoma, in 
                                                                                                                           
 104 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a). 
 105 Id. § 3002(c). The federal government maintains a consultation database that provides contact 
information for tribes to aid the consultation process. National NAGPRA Online Databases, NAT’L 
PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nagpra/ONLINEDB/INDEX.HTM [https://perma.cc/H75Z-4BX6]. 
 106 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c). 
 107 Id. § 3002(d). 
 108 Id. § 3004. The Smithsonian is an exception to this rule. As noted above, the Smithsonian was 
covered by a similar act, passed the previous year, entitled, The National Museum of the American 
Indian Act. Pub. L. 101-185. It should also be noted that the NAGPRA does not apply to private indi-
viduals. 
 109 25 U.S.C. § 3002. 
 110 Id. § 3003. 
 111 Id. § 3005. 
 112 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(2) (2015). 
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conformance with his wishes, Thorpe was buried in the newly re-named town 
of Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania. The remains were interred, and a tourist memori-
al was erected over them. These arrangements were supposedly made by 
Thorpe’s third wife, Patsy, in exchange for a lump sum of cash.113 In 2010, 
Thorpe’s children and the Sac and Fox Nation sued the town demanding the 
return of the remains using a NAGPRA claim.114 Given that Thorpe’s remains 
were removed from tribal lands before the enactment of NAGPRA, in order for 
a NAGPRA claim to succeed, the town borough containing the memorial 
needed to qualify as a “museum” under the Act. The lower court agreed that 
the borough was a museum under NAGPRA, and given the borough’s prior 
receipt of federal funds, must comply with NAGPRA.115  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this holding.116 After a 
lengthy analysis of legislative intent, the court concluded that “Congress did 
not intend the result required by a literal application [of the definition of ‘mu-
seum’].”117 Crucially, the court held that, under NAGPRA, “a museum is [con-
sidered as] holding or collecting the remains for the purposes of display or 
study, as opposed to serving as an original burial site.”118 Thus, a passive hold-
ing intended as a “final resting place” by a federally funded institution does not 
qualify as a museum.119 It remains unclear how a court would rule in deciding 
whether a research lab located within a federally funded institution of higher 
learning would qualify. The California legislature’s 2018 law, for instance, 
adopted a broad campus-wide interpretation of NAGPRA.120 
B. Human Remains 
NAGPRA covers five types of Native American “cultural items”: human 
remains,121 associated funerary objects,122 unassociated funerary objects,123 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Brady, supra note 13. 
 114 Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 115 Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, No. 3:10-CV-01317, 2011 WL 5878377, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 
23, 2011), aff’d, 770 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2014). “The District Court concluded that the Borough was a 
‘museum’ within the meaning of NAGPRA and provisions of that law required the Borough to disin-
ter Thorpe’s remains and turn them over to the Sac and Fox tribe as requested by John Thorpe.” 
Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 257. 
 116 Id. at 266. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Assemb. B. 2836 (Cal. 2018); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8026. 
 121 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d). 
 122 Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(A) (defining associated funerary objects as, “objects that, as 
a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to have been placed with 
individual human remains either at the time of death or later, and both the human remains and associ-
ated funerary objects are presently in the possession or control of a Federal agency or museum, except 
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sacred objects,124 and objects of cultural patrimony.125 What exactly qualifies 
as human remains under the Act is currently unclear and has been the subject 
of several federal lawsuits. 
 Human remains are quite broadly defined as “the physical remains of the 
body of a person of Native American ancestry.”126 The broad definition of hu-
man remains entails that the Act covers a wide range of human remains from a 
few bone fragments to an entire corpse. Notably, NAGPRA’s language of the 
“physical remains of the body” should apply to transplantable organs like cor-
neas or hearts. This would uncontestably be the case if, for example, a federal-
ly funded museum had in its possession a preserved heart taken from a Native 
American. Whether “human remains” should apply to contemporary remains 
will be discussed further below, but it is worth noting here that neither the text 
of the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (“NOTA”),127 nor a state law 
modeled on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,128 conflict with such a reading 
of NAGPRA.129 
Whether NAGPRA applies to body parts that have been excised from a 
living person, such as blood or tissue, has never been litigated. Between the 
legislative history, NAGPRA, and the published Department of the Interior 
interpretations of it, NAGPRA should be interpreted by courts as only applica-
ble to bodily materials from deceased bodies. This means that cases such as 
                                                                                                                           
that other items exclusively made for burial purposes or to contain human remains shall be considered 
as associated funerary objects”). 
 123 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d); see also 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(B) (defining unassociated funerary objects 
as, “objects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to have 
been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later, where the remains are 
not in the possession or control of the Federal agency or museum and the objects can be identified by 
a preponderance of the evidence as related to specific individuals or families or to known human re-
mains or, by a preponderance of the evidence, as having been removed from a specific burial site of an 
individual culturally affiliated with a particular Indian tribe”). 
 124 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C) (defining sacred objects as “ceremonial objects which are needed by 
traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions 
by their present-day adherents”). 
 125 Id. at § 3001(3)(D) (“‘[C]ultural patrimony’ shall mean an object having ongoing historical, 
traditional, or cultural importance central to the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization itself, 
rather than property owned by an individual tribal or organization member. These objects are of such 
central importance that they may not be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual tribal 
or organizational member. Such objects must have been considered inalienable by the culturally affili-
ated Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization at the time the object was separated from such 
group.”).  
 126 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1). 
 127 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-507 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 274–274e 
(2001)). 
 128 See, e.g., MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 113A, § 16 (2019). 
 129 There is, for example, no reason to read NAGPRA as excluding organ donation by Native 
American individuals. NAGPRA has a provision that permits bodily remains to be transferred if given 
with the “full knowledge and consent of the next of kin.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13). 
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Moore v. Regents that involve tissue from a living donor, should not entail a 
NAGPRA claim.130 A comparable case did arise, for example, involving blood 
taken from members of the Havasupai Tribe.131 In that case, tribal members 
consented to participate in a diabetes research study conducted by researchers 
at the University of Arizona. Without their consent, other researchers utilized 
the blood samples to conduct research unconnected to the diabetes project. The 
research produced a host of publications, “[s]ome of the papers generated from 
the blood samples dealt with schizophrenia, inbreeding and theories about an-
cient human population migrations from Asia to North America. The latter 
body of work is contrary to the Havasupai belief that, as a people, they origi-
nated in the Grand Canyon.”132 The case was treated in a similar manner to 
Moore as one of fraud and informed consent.133 
Human remains under NAGPRA “does not include remains or portions of 
remains that may reasonably be determined to have been freely given or natu-
rally shed by the individual from whose body they were obtained, such as hair 
made into ropes or nets.”134 The exclusion of “freely given or naturally shed” 
items from the definition of human remains tracks contemporary understand-
ing of human remains. Regenerative body parts that are typically shed as 
waste, like finger nail clippings and hair, are typically unmentioned in most 
health codes, or other similar regulations of human bodies and parts.135 To be 
protected by NAGPRA, a rope made from human hair would therefore need to 
be qualify as a funerary object, sacred object, or object of cultural patrimony. 
Otherwise, NAGPRA is broad. It applies to whole bodies, but also to frag-
ments of skulls or individual teeth. Technically, under the Act, some ambiguity 
could exist over the classification of objects that incorporate non-freely given 
human remains. War shirts that include human hair and scalps are one such 
example. If the incorporated object also qualifies as a sacred object or an ob-
ject of cultural patrimony, then theoretically there is tension as to whether the 
object should be classified as human remains or not. Surprisingly, this ambigu-
ity is not legally significant under the Act in a general sense because it classi-
fies human remains together with funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects 
of cultural patrimony as cultural items. There is notably limited distinction be-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents, 973 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 131 Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 132 Id. at 1067. 
 133 See id.; Moore, 973 P.2d at 479. 
 134 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1). 
 135 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 117700 (West 2015) (defining regulated medical 
waste). 
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tween these categories under the Act.136 The distinction does, however, matter 
in terms of tribal designation. The Justice Department has made clear that in 
such cases, the object should be classified as the property of the tribe who 
made the object.137 Regarding the applicability of NAGPRA to human remains 
incorporated into objects that do not meet the definition of cultural items, the 
Justice Department has noted that “[t]he legislative history is silent on this is-
sue. Determination of the proper disposition of such human remains must nec-
essarily be made on a case-by-case basis.”138 
Two additional important elements of the definition of human remains are 
unclear under the Act: genetic lineage and age. NAGPRA does not apply a 
condition of formal tribal membership or personal identity. Rather, its language 
is simply that of “a person of Native American ancestry.”139 In the context of 
ancient and older remains, the lack of a precondition of formal membership is 
appropriate and logical because the individual who lived before the rise of 
modern tribal membership criteria. The case of the prehistoric Kennewick man 
is an obvious example of the limitations of a tribal membership requirement.140 
On the other hand, the rise of genetic testing techniques has made the question 
of ancestry significantly more complicated than Congress likely contemplated 
in 1990 when the Act passed. With the rise of genetic testing techniques, re-
searchers are increasingly able to positively identify the Native American an-
cestry of ancient remains, but also of living individuals. The prospects and per-
ils of genetic testing for Native American ancestry was made all too clear by 
the recent episode involving Senator Elizabeth Warren.141 Analysis of Senator 
Warren’s DNA showed that she likely had a Native American ancestor. Techni-
                                                                                                                           
 136 Often the biggest challenge for NAGPRA repatriation claims is distinguishing between more 
mundane individually owned and fully alienable objects, which are not covered under NAGPRA, and 
sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony, which are covered under NAGPRA. 
 137 See 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1) (“For the purposes of determining cultural affiliation, human re-
mains incorporated into a funerary object, sacred object, or object of cultural patrimony . . . must be 
considered as part of that item.”). 
 138 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62134-01, 
62137 (Dec. 4, 1995) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 10.2). 
 139 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1) (“Human remains means the physical remains of the body of a person 
of Native American ancestry. The term does not include remains or portions of remains that may rea-
sonably be determined to have been freely given or naturally shed by the individual from whose body 
they were obtained, such as hair made into ropes or nets. For the purposes of determining cultural 
affiliation, human remains incorporated into a funerary object, sacred object, or object of cultural 
patrimony, as defined below, must be considered as part of that item.”). 
 140 See generally THOMAS, supra note 3. 
 141 Elizabeth Warren Releases DNA Analysis Supporting Native American Ancestry Claims, BOS-
TON 25 NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.boston25news.com/news/elizabeth-warren-releases-dna-
analysis-supporting-her-claim-of-native-american-ancestry/853329118 [https://perma.cc/P9KN-AJ4X]. 
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cally, then, there is a set of circumstances wherein her remains could be cov-
ered by NAGPRA.142 
Whether NAGPRA applies to the deceased bodies and parts of all Native 
Americans, regardless of what genetic test used, is also unclear. Does the Act 
only apply to older remains or to contemporary ones as well? Some state laws 
that mirror NAGPRA and extend protection to state lands set exact age re-
quirements for what qualifies as “human remains.” In Arizona, the remains 
must be from a human who “died more than fifty years before the remains are 
discovered.”143 No such limitation exists in the text of the federal law. 
The existing case law about NAGPRA’s applicability is contradictory. 
The Western District of Texas held that contemporary remains are not covered 
under NAGPRA. In Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon,144 a tribe 
that sought to prevent an investigative disinternment and autopsy argued that 
NAGPRA applied to a recently buried corpse. The court ruled that although the 
language of NAGPRA was unclear:  
[The p]lacement of the term “human remains” within the larger cat-
egory of “cultural items” thus suggests that NAGPRA was not 
meant to apply to a recently buried corpse which is of no particular 
cultural or anthropological interest, but which is sought by state au-
thorities for the purposes of conducting an inquest.145  
It is unclear how old the remains need to be, but the court pointed to the Ar-
chaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979’s discussion of objects of “ar-
chaeological interest” as a guide.146 Under this more limited reading of 
NAGPRA, contemporary remains are not covered by NAGPRA. 
In contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota and 
the Third Circuit Court have both taken a more expansive view, suggesting that 
NAGPRA applies more broadly. In Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,147 the South Dakota court upheld the application of NAGPRA to 
remains that had been buried in 1900 and did not appear to be of any particular 
archaeological import. The court addressed the issue of age directly, stating: 
Defendants’ suggestion, in oral argument, that the Act applies only 
to prehistoric human remains, cannot be accepted. A statute must be 
                                                                                                                           
 142 NAGPRA’s further requirement for “cultural affiliation” could prevent a modern tribe from 
asserting a NAGPRA ownership claim to remains with such a tangential genetic link. Lineal descend-
ants of the individual would, however, still have a valid NAGPRA claim. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a). 
 143 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-865(J)(5) (2018). 
 144 Kickapoo, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 645–46. 
 145 Id. at 650. 
 146 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (2012)). 
 147 Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (D.S.D. 2000).  
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interpreted “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word” 
within it. . . . If the Act applied only to prehistoric human remains, 
its priority for lineal descendants in questions of ownership and con-
trol of human remains and associated funerary objects would be 
meaningless, since it is nearly, if not completely, impossible to de-
termine the lineal descendants of persons who died before recorded 
time. The Act must therefore be interpreted to apply to all human 
remains within the meaning of 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(1), and not mere-
ly human remains of prehistoric origin.148 
Similarly, the Third Circuit in the Thorpe case, discussed above, accepted 
the lower court’s ruling that NAGPRA applied to the remains even though Jim 
Thorpe had died in the 1950s.149 The lower court rejected the defendant’s as-
sertion that NAGPRA was inapplicable “[b]ecause the complaint alleges that 
Jim Thorpe was of Native American ancestry, specifically of Sac and Fox line-
age, his remains fall within the ambit of the regulatory definition.”150 
The lack of uniformity on the applicability of NAGPRA to contemporary 
remains is troubling, particularly when paired with the genetic ancestry discus-
sion above. The scope of NAGPRA under these two interpretations becomes 
broader and more relevant to a wide range of biomedical research and medical 
education. Some states, for instance, maintain laws that allocate the bodies of 
unclaimed dead to medical schools or other medical education programs.151 If 
an allocated body is later discovered to have Native American ancestry, should 
a NAGPRA claim be permitted? 
There is unfortunately no bright line rule contained within NAGPRA or the 
case law regarding the age of the remains. My sense is that if presented with a 
case involving a very recent decedent, the court would, and should, follow 
Kickapoo and rule that NAGPRA is inapplicable.152 Kickapoo is the only prior 
case to involve a recently deceased body with flesh, as opposed to decades old 
bones.153 Second, even the Third Circuit in Thorpe,154 which focused its analysis 
on the “museum” question and let stand the lower court’s holding on applicabil-
ity of the law to the remains on the basis of age, expressed some skepticism 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)). 
 149 Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 266. 
 150 Thorpe, 2011 WL 13134010, at *9. 
 151 Laws permitting the allocation of unknown and unclaimed corpses in morgues to medical 
schools persist today. New York only modified its practice of making unclaimed and insolvent dead 
bodies available for medical research and education in 2016. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4211–
4212 (McKinney 2016); see also Bernstein, supra note 89. 
 152 See generally Kickapoo, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See generally Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255. 
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about the applicability of NAGPRA to contemporary remains.155 The court noted 
that, in large part, NAGPRA is intended to atone for the unjust treatment of Na-
tive Americans that was perpetuated because they were Native American.156 Yet 
in both opinions, it is clear that the judges in Kickapoo and Thorpe believe that 
contemporary non-NAGPRA law can sufficiently and justly protect the re-
mains.157 While it is true that younger identifiable Native American remains are 
now more readily protected under broader common law and state statutes, this 
line of reasoning is fraught because, as will be discussed in Part IV, there are 
severe limitations and confusions about the existing legal status of human re-
mains. A contemporary case involving Native American remains that fell within 
such a potential gap and risked a grossly unjust outcome could result in judicial 
recognition of a NAGPRA claim to contemporary remains.158 
C. Ownership and Property 
For the purposes of this paper, the most significant, and heretofore over-
looked, provision of NAGPRA is section 3002: “Ownership.”159 The section 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. at 265. The court, for example, was clear that the purpose of NAGPRA was not to govern 
familial disputes over the disposition of human remains. “It was not intended to be wielded as a sword 
to settle familial disputes within Native American families. Yet, that is what we would allow if we 
were to enforce NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions as written here.” Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. (acknowledging the importance of NAGPRA but limiting its applicability); Kickapoo, 
46 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (limiting NAGPRA so it does not nullify other statutory law). 
 158 Brotherton v. Cleveland, which had a similar fact pattern and judicial decision on property 
status of human remains, is such an example. See 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 159 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a). In its entirety the section reads: 
(a) Native American human remains and objects 
 
The ownership or control of Native American cultural items which are excavated or 
discovered on Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990, shall be (with priority 
given in the order listed)— 
 (1) in the case of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects, 
in the lineal descendants of the Native American; or 
 (2) in any case in which such lineal descendants cannot be ascertained, and in the 
case of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimo-
ny— 
 (A) in the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal land such 
objects or remains were discovered; 
 (B) in the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization which has the closest cultur-
al affiliation with such remains or objects and which, upon notice, states a claim for 
such remains or objects; or 
 (C) if the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably ascertained and if 
the objects were discovered on Federal land that is recognized by a final judgment of 
the Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of Claims as the aboriginal 
land of some Indian tribe— 
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references the “ownership or control” of Native American “human remains and 
objects.”160 It details a descending list of recognized claimants for repatriation 
of cultural items, starting with lineal descendants and ending with any tribe 
that can demonstrate a cultural relationship to the remains.161 No existing cases 
or literature have directly interpreted the ownership section of NAGPRA with 
regards to the uniqueness of property status of Native American remains.162 
The focus in much of the case law has been not what the remains are, but ra-
ther who has a valid claim regardless of legal status. This existing debate has 
been particularly important with regards to ancient unidentifiable remains. For 
example, in the case of the Kennewick man there was controversy over wheth-
er a modern tribe could assert a NAGPRA claim to 9000-year-old remains.163 
Until now, attention has not been paid to the property status implications of 
this section of the Act for Native American human remains. One likely reason 
for this is that, as will be argued in Part IV, Native American remains have, 
unlike non-Native human remains, been legally recognized as objects of prop-
erty for over a hundred years. As will be shown, the American Antiquities Act 
of 1906 classified Native American remains as federal property.164 The biggest 
change under NAGPRA then, is not simply the accordance of property status, 
but rather a shift in status as property owned not by the federal government, 
but by lineal descendants and tribal governments. 
The individual and communal property reading of the Act advanced in 
this Article can be countered with the argument that the term “control” is in-
tended to apply to human remains, and the term of “property” is intended to 
apply to objects. The problem with this construction is that, as detailed above, 
the definitions section of the Act makes it clear that human remains are to be 
                                                                                                                           
 (1) in the Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally occupying the area in which 
the objects were discovered, if upon notice, such tribe states a claim for such remains or 
objects, or 
 (2) if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a different tribe has a 
stronger cultural relationship with the remains or objects than the tribe or organization 
specified in paragraph (1), in the Indian tribe that has the strongest demonstrated rela-
tionship, if upon notice, such tribe states a claim for such remains or objects. 
Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, In the Smaller Scope of Conscience: The Native 
American Graves Protection & Repatriation Act Twelve Years After, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
153, 171–75 (2002). The article outlines the sixteen civil NAGPRA suits brought to protect burial 
grounds and the nine civil cases involving the NAGPRA collection provisions that arose between 
1990 and 2002. Id. 
 163 Bonnichsen v. United States Department of the Army is the most famous case and it centered 
on a 9000-year-old skeleton known as the “Kennewick Man.” 969 F. Supp. 614, 617–19 (D. Or. 
1997). 
 164 16 U.S.C. § 433, repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, § 7, Stat. 3272 (2014). 
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considered as cultural items along with various types of funerary and sacred 
physical objects.165 The Act explicitly groups them together for shared treat-
ment for much of its language.166 
Objection can also be raised that since 18 U.S. C. § 1170(a) criminalized 
the trade of Native American remains, Native remains should not be consid-
ered as property. This argument runs into difficulty because the provision only 
criminalizes sale without rightful possession. Furthermore, § 1170(b) parallels 
§ 1170(a) by outlawing the sale of cultural items obtained in violation of 
NAGPRA. Limitations on the right to sale are not on their face incongruous 
with property status, as will be discussed further in Part V. 
Some courts have indicated an awareness of property status under 
NAGPRA. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, for example, in the dispute involving the ancient remains discovered at 
UC Davis, noted that, “NAGPRA extends rights of ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ 
over human remains and funerary items to qualifying tribes. Accordingly, the 
present dispute is appropriately analogized to an ordinary property dispute, in 
which the parties assert conflicting ownership interests.”167 Consequently, it 
can be seen that NAGPRA recognizes both individual property and communal 
property in Native American remains. 
The perpetuation of property status of Native American human remains 
under NAGPRA is significant because, at common law, human remains are not 
property. The prior lack of legal attention on the property status of Native 
American remains is significant not only for Native American law, but also for 
the regulation of human remains generally. Property status, as will be shown in 
Part IV, has important implications for the ability of Native American individ-
uals and tribes to control and protect their dead. The next section details how 
common law and state statutes pertaining to cemeteries and corpses have his-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See 25 U.S.C. § 3001. 
 166 It seems the closest anyone has directly come was in the comments received during the comment 
period before the Act was passed. The final rule by the Department of Interior notes the following: 
One commenter recommended reiterating the applicability of “right of possession” to 
human remains and associated funerary objects recognized in the last sentence of sec-
tion 2 (13) of the Act in this section of the regulations. American law generally recog-
nizes that human remains cannot be “owned.” This interpretation is consistent with the 
second sentence of section 2 (13) of the Act that specifically refers to unassociated fu-
nerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony, and with section 7 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Act in which no right of possession to human remains or associ-
ated funerary objects is inferred.  
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62134-01 (Dec. 4, 
1995).  
 167 White v. Univ. of Cal., No. C 12-01978 RS, 2012 WL 12335354, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 
2012), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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torically been patch-worked instruments for protecting human remains. More-
over, Native American burial grounds and remains were systematically exclud-
ed from these inefficient mechanisms. In contrast, as will be argued in Section 
V, under NAGPRA, Native American remains, given their different status from 
non-Native remains, are now the most effectively protected human remains. 
IV. LEGAL STATUS, TREATMENT, AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN REMAINS 
The regulation of Native American remains exists within a wide context 
that is both relational, namely the legal status, treatment, and protection of all 
human remains, and historical, namely the treatment of Native American re-
mains before NAGPRA. There are several ways in which states and the federal 
government can regulate and protect human remains. The five major avenues 
are: (1) state protections of graves and graveyards, (2) federal protections of 
burial grounds, (3) criminalization, (4) rights of disposition and control over 
dead bodies, and (5) property rights. Historically Native American remains 
were treated differently in all five areas by the law, and important distinctions 
persist under NAGPRA. The next five subsections of this paper examine each 
of these five legal mechanisms in turn. 
A. State Protection of Graves and Gravesites 
Historically, in America, protection of the repose of the dead was largely 
accomplished through statutes that outlawed grave robbing or disturbing ceme-
teries. Regulation pertaining to gravesites is therefore intimately tied to the 
protection of human remains. This section focuses on the protection of land 
that contains Native and non-Native remains. Currently, in all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia, statutes regulate cemeteries and marked graves and 
protect them from vandalism and desecration.168 A typical modern statute 
reads, “‘[e]very person is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . who unlawfully or 
without right willfully . . . [d]estroys, cuts, mutilates, effaces, or otherwise in-
jures, tears down, or removes . . . any tomb . . . [or who] [o]bliterates any 
grave, niche, or crypt.’”169 Until recently, however, most statutes did not pro-
vide protections for Native American mortuary practices and unmarked 
graves.170 In fact, “[p]rior to 1989, nearly half of state health and safety codes 
regulating the care of the [buried] dead applied only to marked graves in clear-
                                                                                                                           
 168 Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 31, at 39. 
 169 John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement 
Respecting Cultural Property (Part One), 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 349, 401 (2004) (quot-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.35 (West 2019)). 
 170 Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 31, at 46. 
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ly established cemeteries.”171 Consequently, in 1982, when Wana the Bear, a 
direct Miwok tribe descendant, attempted to halt the bulldozing of over 200 
Miwok tribal graves, the California Court of Appeals affirmed that the burial 
ground “is not a cemetery entitled to protection under the California cemetery 
law.”172 The court, therefore, allowed the burial ground to be bulldozed as part 
of the construction of a residential development.173 The case demonstrates the 
significant implications of the failure to recognize Native American burial 
grounds alongside traditional non-Native cemeteries. Further, it illustrates that 
the issues at stake regarding the protection of burial grounds are not exclusive-
ly the ability to protect the repose of the dead. Issues can also arise regarding 
protection of sacred or ceremonial lands integral to Native people’s cultural 
practices and, significantly for all of us, environmental concerns regarding the 
development of land. Dam projects in particular have raised numerous con-
cerns for their impacts on Native burial grounds.174 
1. Differential Treatment of Burial Grounds 
The refusal to provide Native American burial grounds with the same pro-
tection as cemeteries created particular vulnerabilities for Native American 
remains. As was discussed in Part II, however, for much of American history, 
remains in cemeteries were also vulnerable to grave robbers. Moreover, even 
cemeteries can be subject to land development, transfer by private owners, and 
eminent domain. Thus, even if the Miwok burial ground had been recognized 
as a cemetery, equivalent to a non-Native cemetery, this would not have neces-
sarily protected the land from development. One of the most cited cases on this 
matter is In re Beekman St., in which the widening of a street in New York in 
1856 created the necessity of moving “the bodies contained in eighty graves, 
amounting to about one hundred”175 from the Brick Presbyterian Church 
graveyard. This practice continues today. In 2012, New Jersey exercised emi-
                                                                                                                           
 171 Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights Law, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363, 368 (1999). 
 172 Wana the Bear v. Cmty. Const., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 173 Id. See generally WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR (2011). 
 174 See Cowlitz Tribe of Indians v. City of Tacoma, 253 F.2d 625, 625 (9th Cir. 1957); Sequoyah 
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
Golf courses have also caused concern. See Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2001). 
This case centered upon the construction of a golf course in Texas. The project continued despite the 
discovery of Native remains. The remains were reinterred by the city at a ceremony witnessed by 
representatives of “various tribal organizations.” The case is of additional interest because Castro 
Romero sued for personal damages as a member of the Apache tribe after his request for control of the 
remains was denied. Id. at 352. 
 175 Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 301 (1861) (citing In re Beekman St., 4 Bradf. 503, 532 
(N.Y. 1857)). 
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nent domain over a cemetery operated by St. Mary’s Church Gloucester.176 The 
Church objected to the taking on technical grounds but did not seek to assert a 
claim about the inappropriateness of a state takings claim upon a cemetery. As 
noted by then Judge Cardozo, “[t]he dead are to rest where they have been laid 
unless reason of substance is brought forward for disturbing their repose.”177 
Therefore, although the common law historically conferred more diligent pro-
tection to cemeteries compared to burial grounds, cemetery lands were and can 
be expropriated, particularly for public works. 
Although neither the common law nor state statutes require the protection 
of the integrity of a cemetery’s land, they do require the state or the landowner 
to provide notice to family members and to transfer identifiable remains. In the 
Beekman Street case mentioned above, for instance, Maria Smith prevailed 
with the court ordering that “the remains of her father be reinterred in a sepa-
rate grave in such suitable locality as she might select, that the existing monu-
ment be erected over such grave, and that the necessary expense be defrayed 
out of the funds in court.”178 Similarly, an Oregon statute states that: 
Prior to any removal [from a cemetery] authorized under this sec-
tion, written notice must be given to the family, or next of kin of the 
deceased, if known, and if unknown, notice of the removal shall be 
published for at least four successive weeks in a newspaper of gen-
eral circulation in the county in which the cemetery is located and 
twice in a newspaper with statewide circulation.179  
In contrast, as in Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc., by excluding 
Native American burial grounds from common law and statutory protection of 
graveyards, notice and transfer were not required before construction com-
menced.180 Instead, the graves were systematically bulldozed and emptied by 
the developer. Thus, the refusal to accord Native American burial grounds with 
equivalent status to cemeteries often resulted in unjust treatment.181 
                                                                                                                           
 176 State v. St. Mary’s Church Gloucester, A-5448-10T1, 2012 WL 4795611, at *1 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 177 Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926). 
 178 Wynkoop, 42 Pa. at 301 (discussing the disposition of In re Beekman St., 4 Bradf. at 503). 
 179 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97.450 (2018). 
 180 See Wana the Bear, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
 181 In some cases, the re-interment of Native American remains buried in cemeteries was given 
serious consideration by a court. For instance, in United States v. Unknown Heirs, the expansion of a 
military project required a cemetery to be moved. 152 F. Supp. 452, 453 (W.D. Okla. 1957). The 
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the woman did not have a marriage to the chieftain recognized by common law, his decedents’ prefer-
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2. Modern Recognition and Protections 
Today, many states have amended their laws to protect Native American 
burial sites comparably to, if not more so than, cemeteries. California amended 
the Health and Safety Code to include in the definition of cemetery a “burial 
park” or “[a] place where six or more bodies are buried.”182 Furthermore, the 
State Public Resources Code now requires that “[a] person shall not knowingly 
and willfully excavate upon, or remove, destroy, injure, or deface, any historic 
or prehistoric ruins, [or] burial grounds . . . .”183 Oregon has taken a similar 
historic approach of bundling cemeteries and burial grounds together, holding 
that “a cemetery or burial ground containing human remains that were interred 
before February 14, 1909 may not be discontinued or declared abandoned or 
have remains removed from the burial ground or cemetery without prior notice 
to and comment by the Oregon Commission on Historic Cemeteries.”184 
Shockingly, even if a court acknowledged that a Native American burial 
should be classified as a protected grave under relevant statutes, sometimes 
judges refuse to apply the law to protect Native remains. Such were arguably 
the circumstances in the pre-NAGPRA case of Newman v. State.185 In 1964, 
Arnold Clifford Newman, a fourth-year undergraduate, came across the coffin 
of a Seminole Indian in a Florida swamp that had been undisturbed for about 
two years. Newman grabbed the skull, and he and his companion took pictures 
with it. Newman was convicted of a misdemeanor for the willful destruction, 
mutilation, defacement, injury, or removal of the contents of a grave.186 On 
appeal, the court held that conviction required that the desecration under the 
law had to be perpetrated “wantonly and maliciously.”187 After examining 
Newman’s character, report card, and passion for snake hunting, the judge 
concluded that Newman could not have committed the act of grabbing the 
                                                                                                                           
ence should be given priority. (Typically, at common law, the widow’s preference is given priority). 
See id. at 455. 
 182 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7003 (West 2018) (“‘Cemetery’ means either of the follow-
ing: (1) Any of the following that is used or intended to be used and dedicated for cemetery purposes: 
(A) A burial park, for earth interments. (B) A mausoleum, for crypt or vault interments. (C) A crema-
tory and columbarium, for cinerary interments. (2) A place where six or more human bodies are bur-
ied.”). 
 183 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.5 (West 2011); see also id. § 5097.9 (stating that “nor shall any 
such agency or party cause severe or irreparable damage to any Native American sanctified cemetery, 
place of worship, religious or ceremonial site, or sacred shrine located on public property, except on a 
clear and convincing showing that the public interest and necessity so require”). 
 184 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97.450. 
 185 See Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Although, given that 
NAGPRA only applies to older remains, the recent remains at issue in this case would likely not be 
covered by the Act if the case happened today. 
 186 Id. at 480. 
 187 Id. 
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skull with wanton and malicious intent and, therefore, “quashed” the convic-
tion.188 Consequently, it is not always sufficient for Native American burials to 
be accorded definitional status equal to that accorded to non-Native graves. 
They must also be accorded equivalent respect for their sanctity. 
3. Vulnerabilities of Burial Grounds That Require Special Attention 
In a practical sense, however, even if Native American burial grounds are 
accorded equivalent legal status and respect to non-Native cemeteries under 
statutes and common law, difficulties persist regarding their protection. The 
common law is not designed to protect unidentifiable remains located in ceme-
teries or burial grounds. The protection of named dead in American law is par-
tially reflective of cultural values informed by Christianity. Christian burial 
practices tend to center upon the marking and naming of the deceased on 
tombstones. Many Native American remains are difficult to identify due to age 
or lack of burial markings. Native American burial practices reflected a differ-
ent religious system, and most burials tended to be unmarked.189 The common 
law is also not designed to protect long dead remains, those roughly over one 
hundred years old. The common law is individually based, and authority is 
derived from the rights of identifiable next of kin.190 As a result, the vast ma-
jority of successful non-criminal grave protection cases involve individually 
named plaintiffs bringing suit in relation to individual and identifiable remains 
in a grave.191 Plaintiffs, as direct descendants, can also illustrate legal title to 
the plot of land.192 In In re Beekman Street, mentioned above, eighty graves, 
holding the remains of over 100 individuals, were emptied as part of the wid-
                                                                                                                           
 188 Id. at 484. 
 189 For instance, in Newman, William McKinley Osceola II, a Seminole Indian, testified. The 
court recounted:  
[T]he kin of the dead cannot go back except four moons, or two months, after a body is 
buried; in all his life he never saw an Indian go back to a grave. After the fourth moon 
they forget about the body altogether, unless there is some reason to go back. To mark 
the grave, four sticks are placed across a box and after that everything just rots down to 
the ground, that’s all. The burial place, he said, is kept secret. 
Id. at 481. Burial practices among Native American tribes vary greatly. They include earthly inter-
ment, the construction of earthen mounds, burial platforms, cremation, and interment in caves. 
 190 See, e.g., Massaro v. Charles J. O’Shea Funeral Home, 738 N.Y.S.2d 384 (App. Div. 2002). In 
Massaro, the court recognized that the son of a decedent could recover damages for emotional dis-
tress, but held that a grandchild who had witnessed the same disturbance of the corpse could not re-
cover because he was not the next of kin. Id. at 386. 
 191 See, e.g., In re Beekman St., 4 Bradf. at 503–32; see also SAMUEL B. RUGGLES, AN EX-
AMINATION OF THE LAW OF BURIAL, IN A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK IN 
THE MATTER OF TAKING A PORTION OF THE BRICK PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, IN WIDENING 
BEEKMAN STREET, IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1856).  
 192 See Hairston v. Gen. Pipeline Const., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 663, 670 (W. Va. 2010). 
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ening of the street.193 Only five were identifiable.194 The plaintiff identified her 
father’s remains by a ribbon tied in the decedent’s hair.195 The court ruled that 
she, as next of kin, was entitled to notice and compensation for re-internment, 
but did not discuss the fate of all of the other remains.196 With the rise of genet-
ic sequencing techniques, previously unidentifiable remains can be identified, 
and kin can be established generations later. Long dead and unidentifiable re-
mains remain a problem for the common law. 
These limitations of the common law are troubling for Native American 
burial grounds. The cases where Native American remains were disinterred 
without notice or consent tend to involve the ancient and unnamed dead. For 
instance, in the 1982 case of Wana the Bear, the plaintiff filed a claim on the 
basis of his tribal heritage, not on the basis of a named individual he was de-
scended from.197 These limitations are also problematic for non-Native popula-
tions, including early American settlers. In the 1990 case Sanford v. Vinal, the 
plaintiff was an eighth-generation descendant of Edward Wanton. Wanton had 
died in 1716 and was buried in what became known as the “Old Quaker Burial 
Ground” in Plymouth, Massachusetts.198 By the 1900s, the cemetery had been 
fully abandoned and overgrown with “dense briars.”199 In 1987, when the city 
approved a construction project on a tract of land that included the burial 
grounds, the descendant sued to enjoin the construction project.200 The judge 
held that the descendant did not have standing to sue:  
[Although] [t]he mere passage of time does not extinguish the rights 
of descendants . . . where the family has ceased to visit the cemetery 
and where they have so long neglected to care for it that the ground 
is no longer recognizable as a cemetery, the family burial ground has 
been abandoned, and with it the private standing of the descendants 
to require that those who own the land abstain from using the land 
for other purposes.201 
                                                                                                                           
 193 In re Beekman St., 4 Bradf. at 507; see RUGGLES, supra note 191, at 15. 
 194 In re Beekman St., 4 Bradf. at 507. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Wana the Bear, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
 198 Sanford v. Vinal, 552 N.E.2d 579, 580 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). 
 199 Id. at 581. 
 200 To give the city council its proper due, the exact location of the cemetery had been forgotten 
and the original efforts by a team of researchers failed to locate any remains. The city therefore al-
lowed the construction project to proceed but required the project to halt if any remains were discov-
ered. Id. at 581–82. 
 201 Id. at 585–86. Unlike in Sanford, the Miwok people did not voluntarily abandon the burial 
ground at issue in Wana the Bear. The Miwok people were forced from their land by the government 
between 1850 and 1870. Wana the Bear, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
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Consequently, the protection of an early American, non-Native gravesite 
in this case was solely up to the discretion of the public. Thus, although a more 
pervasive problem for Native American communities, even non-Native popula-
tions can struggle to assert state level claims in cases involving long dead or 
unidentifiable remains under the common law. 
With the passage of NAGPRA, many states amended their laws to include 
additional protections for Native American burial grounds and Native Ameri-
can remains accidentally disinterred from them. For example, the California 
Health and Safety Code was amended, changing the stage at which human re-
mains are discovered such that:  
(a) Every person who knowingly mutilates or disinters, wantonly 
disturbs, or willfully removes any human remains in or from any lo-
cation other than a dedicated cemetery without authority of law is 
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . (c) If the coroner determines that the 
remains are not subject to his or her authority and if the coroner rec-
ognizes the human remains to be those of a Native American, or has 
reason to believe that they are those of a Native American, he or she 
shall contact, by telephone within 24 hours, the Native American 
Heritage Commission.202  
Similar provisions for notice do not exist if, for example, similarly aged re-
mains of a non-Native, such as a Spanish missionary, were discovered. Most 
states have similar notification laws that pertain to either graveyards or physi-
cal remains, but other states have gone further. “Thirty-four . . . require some 
sort of governmental approval prior to [relocation]. Seventeen states require 
permission of the landowner. Five states, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, and Oregon, give a Native American tribe veto power over the re-
moval and reinterment of the human remains.”203 As illustrated by the Sanford 
case, an unmaintained Native American burial ground would receive greater 
protections than an unmaintained cemetery of early American Quakers, or Pil-
grims, for that matter. 
Native American burial grounds and the remains they contain are there-
fore frequently accorded higher levels of protection compared to non-Native 
cemeteries. This greater level of protection makes particular sense from a jus-
tice perspective. In many instances, Native Americans were forcibly removed 
from their lands. Unlike the Quaker family in Sanford, they did not voluntarily 
abandon or fail to maintain a burial ground. Additionally, as will be seen in our 
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 203 State v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 752 n.17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2001). 
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later discussion with communal property and Native American remains, the 
allowance of communal consent in the case of Native American burial grounds 
makes a significant degree of sense. With ancient and unidentifiable non-
Native graveyards, as the opinion in Sanford notes, the public and state gov-
ernment is granted the authority to protect and regulate.204 A similar logic ap-
plies with tribes, who are more representative ‘public guardians’ for their tribal 
burial grounds. 
B. Federal Protection of Burial Grounds 
State governments are not the only ones who have singled out Native 
American burial grounds for additional protections. The federal government 
has a longstanding and ethically questionable history of doing so. While the 
application of common law protections and existence of state level regulations 
is a relatively recent occurrence, at the federal level, the government sought to 
regulate the wanton excavation of archaeological sites on federal lands long 
before the passage of NAGPRA. These efforts afforded some protection to Na-
tive American burial grounds unavailable at common law. The American An-
tiquities Act of 1906 provided that, “the examinations [of ruins], excavations 
[of archaeological sites], and gatherings [of objects of antiquities] are [to be] 
undertaken for the benefit of reputable museums, universities, colleges, or oth-
er recognized scientific or educational institutions, with a view to increasing 
the knowledge of such objects . . . .”205  
 As illustrated by the 1989 National Geographic article, however, these 
protections were not always effectively enforced.206 Moreover, these laws con-
ferred the control of Native American burial grounds wholly into the hands of 
government officials. NAGPRA altered this federal policy to include Native 
American peoples in the protection and decision-making process regarding 
burial grounds located on federal lands. Currently, any excavations or projects 
must be granted a government permit and must have undergone consultation 
with Native peoples.207 In the case of remains located on tribal lands, the “con-
sent of the appropriate (if any) Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization” is 
required.208 The consent requirement does not, however, pertain to federal 
lands, a feature that mirrors the nonexistence of consent requirements for non-
Native remains in graveyards mentioned earlier.209  
                                                                                                                           
 204 Sanford, 552 N.E.2d at 586. 
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The expanded protection of Native remains and inclusion of Native peo-
ples in decision-making created at the federal level, and prompted at the state 
level, by NAGPRA is a significant achievement. Although the consent of tribes 
is not required under NAGPRA, the act does place duties of care and protec-
tion of any discovered human remains upon the government and its agents. 
The Yankton Sioux Tribe, for instance, sued the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers for failing to comply with the consultation and protection require-
ments of NAGPRA when Native American remains were discovered on federal 
lands as part of a campsite expansion construction project.210 The court granted 
a temporary restraining order preventing further construction until the project 
could comply with the provisions of NAGPRA.211 
The protection of Native American burial grounds has been an issue with 
regards to significantly larger, and more environmentally damaging, construction 
projects.212 Two dam cases that arose before the passage of NAGPRA are worth 
mentioning. First, in 1957, the Cowlitz Tribe sought to enjoin the construction 
of a dam project that would cause the “burial grounds of its ancients . . . [to] be 
desecrated.”213 The tribe’s action was dismissed in a two-page opinion on the 
basis of their lack of title to the land.214 Similarly, in Sequoyah v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority,215 two Cherokee tribes sought to enjoin the construction of 
the same dam that was at issue in the earlier Supreme Court case of Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill.216 The tribes’ claims regarding the protection of their 
burial grounds, however, were relatively weak due to the structure of the law at 
the time. Their two claims were based upon: (1) protection of religious free-
doms;217 and (2) the National Historic Preservation Act.218 The court focused 
on and dismissed the religious claim, before ultimately concluding that be-
cause Congress had exempted the construction of the dam from “any other 
                                                                                                                           
cultural items at issue in this action were not located on tribal lands. Thus, the requirement of consent 
in 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)(2) does not apply in this case [where remains are on federal lands].” 209 
F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (D.S.D. 2002).  
 210 Id. at 1009–10. 
 211 Id. at 1022. 
 212 See JOHN J. COVE, WHAT THE BONES SAY: TASMANIAN ABORIGINES, SCIENCE AND DOMI-
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Franklin dam recognized bones as cultural property and the centrality of cultural property to Aborigi-
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 213 Cowlitz, 253 F.2d at 625. 
 214 Id. at 626. 
 215 Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. at 610. 
 216 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (deciding whether the completion of the 
Tellico Dam violates the Endangered Species Act). 
 217 Specifically, these protections are provided for under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, 
and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, IX; 42 U.S.C. § 1996 
(2012). 
 218 National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (transferred and omitted). 
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law,”219 the court could not bar the construction of the project on the basis of 
any religious or statutory protections.220 
NAGPRA created more substantive avenues for protecting burial grounds 
from dams. The Yankton Sioux Tribe mentioned above sued the Army Corps of 
Engineers two years earlier over the operations of a dam. The dam had been 
built in the 1950s, and the builders failed to remove and reinter many Native 
American remains. As a result of manual and regular lowering of the reservoir 
water level, human remains were frequently exposed. The judge honored the 
tribes petition to enjoin the lowering of the water levels and resulting exposure 
of the Native remains until sufficient protection and proper excavation of the 
remains occurred.221 
Native burial grounds at common and statutory law have therefore argua-
bly gone from some of the least protected to some of the most protected 
gravesites. State courts are increasingly applying common law and statutory 
protections of cemeteries to Native American burial grounds. NAGPRA and 
companion state laws have also resulted in substantive rights to protect Native 
American burial grounds for Native American individuals and tribes. Commu-
nal level tribal protections of burial grounds are particularly significant for en-
abling Native Americans to protect their dead. Most burial grounds that raise 
issues contain ancient remains that are unidentifiable beyond tribal member-
ship. Unfortunately, the protections discussed in the prior two sections pertain 
to in situ remains.222 Disinterred and displayed remains are not covered by 
cemetery and Native burial ground protections. Therefore, we must turn to ex-
amine criminal regulations, the right of disposition, and control over human 
remains and property rights. 
C. Criminal Provisions 
The government, largely at the state level, has been responsible for pass-
ing various statutes outlawing grave robbing, the mutilation of a body, or the 
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 220 Id. The district court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority reached a 
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sale of human remains.223 This is especially true with the passage of modern 
state laws regulating organ donation. Section 16 of the Massachusetts Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, for example, holds that the sale of body parts for trans-
plantation or therapy is a felony.224 Moreover, on the federal level, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 274e makes it unlawful to “transfer any human organ for valuable considera-
tion for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate com-
merce.”225 No section of the federal code, however, seems to outlaw the sale of 
human body parts for non-transplantation purposes. In this instance, Native 
American remains have additional federal protections. Section 4 of NAGPRA 
amended Title 18 of the criminal code and explicitly criminalizes traffic in Na-
tive American remains or cultural items. Consequently, under § 1170(a), “who-
ever knowingly sells, purchases, uses for profit, or transports for sale or profit, 
the human remains of a Native American without the right of possession to 
those remains” shall be fined or imprisoned, or both.226 It is worth highlighting 
here that the provisions do not outlaw the trade in all Native American re-
mains, only those wherein the owner does not have the right of possession. 
This will apply to the vast majority of remains because they were taken with-
out permission or consideration. It is possible, however, that some holders 
could have valid rights of possession and therefore sell the remains. According 
to 25 U.S.C. § 3001:  
The original acquisition of Native American human remains and as-
sociated funerary objects which were excavated, exhumed, or oth-
erwise obtained with full knowledge and consent of the next of kin 
or the official governing body of the appropriate culturally affiliated 
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization is deemed to give right 
of possession to those remains.227  
As we shall see, 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a)’s limitation on sales will become relevant 
to the discussion of ownership and property in Part IV. A small number of cases 
have emerged under § 1170(a), and most of the defendants pled guilty without 
going to trial.228 In 2001, however, the Northern District of Illinois heard one of 
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the only cases to go to trial, United States v. DeLuca, which involved the attempt 
to sell human skull fragments that were most likely Native American.229 While 
the criminal conviction failed the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of evi-
dence, the skull fragments were ultimately repatriated. Consequently, during 
Samuel Morton’s time in the early nineteenth century, Native American skulls 
were granted significantly fewer criminal legal protections from collection and 
sale than for non-Natives. The current state under NAGPRA suggests that Native 
American remains are granted significantly greater protections. 
D. Non-Property Personal Rights of Disposition and  
Control Over Human Remains 
Under the inherited common law from England, human remains were not 
property.230 The next of kin had a limited right and duty to ensure that the re-
mains of their family members were buried. Once a corpse was buried, howev-
er, “[t]he duty of the executor or administrator [was] over, and also his rights, 
except in case of an improper interference with the grave, the body, or the 
grave-clothes of the deceased. The claims of society [had] been entirely satis-
fied.”231 American courts up through the eighteenth century regularly held that 
under the common law there was no actionable interest for the disturbance of a 
buried corpse. Rather, courts often limited family members who experienced 
grave robbing to a claim of trespass of the burial plot.232 For instance, just after 
the Civil War, in 1868, in Meagher v. Driscoll,233 the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts held that in common law, “[t]he only action that can be 
brought for disinterring [a corpse] is trespass quare clausum.”234 
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 234 Id. at 284. 
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1. Expanding Protections for Human Remains and the Introduction of 
Quasi-Property 
After the Civil War, American courts and legislatures increasingly began 
to create more substantive protections for unburied and buried human remains. 
Courts began to recognize actions for the disinterment of, or damage to, human 
remains, and state legislatures began to pass statutes that recognized the next 
of kin’s exclusive rights of possession, control, and disposition of the 
corpse.235 These protections also included statutes criminalizing the grave rob-
bing or other unpermitted disinterment mentioned in the previous sub-
section.236 One of the more interesting legal mechanisms of regulating authori-
ty over human remains was through the legal fiction of quasi-property. Quasi-
property is most frequently linked with the Supreme Court’s 1918 decision in 
International News Services v. Associated Press, Inc.237 It is a mechanism 
whereby judges can accord limited Hohfeldian incidents of ownership.238 Qua-
si-property, a peculiarly American notion, was developed in the nineteenth cen-
tury to meet adjudicative concerns in contexts where rights of use and control 
were needed but where judges did not want to accord a more substantial bun-
dle of property rights or status as an object of property. Crucially for this paper, 
quasi-property is similar to, but is not formally, legal property. 
Quasi-property status of human remains is most commonly cited as origi-
nating in 1872, in Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, with the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court.239 Pierce grew out of a dispute about the burial 
of a decedent between his heir and his widow.240 The opinion is paradigmatic 
of many of cases about human remains because it illustrates the extent to 
which traditional legal authority had not been adapted to adjudicate disputes 
over human remains. Before deciding the case, the judges first conducted a 
lengthy examination of their jurisdictional authority.241 The judges reasoned 
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that given the English abdication of authority over burial law to ecclesiastical 
courts, “[i]n cases like the present no common law action could avail 
much. . . . [However given the lack of American ecclesiastical courts,] [e]quity 
. . . can give a full and complete remedy, and we think the jurisdiction is fully 
adequate to it.”242 The court then went on to assert that the body of the deceased 
is “a sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as they 
have duties to perform towards it arising out of our common humanity.”243 
Mention of the quasi-property status of human remains is sprinkled 
throughout the case law;244 unfortunately, there is little substantive discussion 
of what quasi-property actually means beyond the right of possession for buri-
al. The late William Prosser, a leading tort law expert, stated that, “[i]t seems 
relatively obvious that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to 
meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are 
being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.”245 It is 
clear, however, that the right is not conveyable and that the court “may regu-
late it as such, and change the custody, if improperly managed.”246 Thus, while 
quasi-property has real functional legal significance in deciding between indi-
vidual claimants, as in Pierce, and recovery for damages, it, along with the 
above common law and statutory protections, is more situated for the protec-
tion of recently dead remains awaiting burial. 
2. The Challenge of Long Dead Remains for Quasi-Property 
Quasi-property is not easily applied to long dead, or ancient, remains. 
None of the discoverable quasi-property case law involves long dead remains 
retained in museum collections. It is telling that when the heirs of Geronimo 
brought a lawsuit against the Skull and Bones Society, Yale University, and the 
federal government with the aim of recovering the skull and other bones of 
Geronimo, which were supposedly looted by members of the university in 
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1918 or 1919, they did so under the provisions of NAGPRA.247 The plaintiff’s 
complaint sought “an order compelling defendants to account for and turn over 
to plaintiffs all human remains and associated funerary objects of Geronimo 
subject to their authority and power, or in their control or possession.”248 Es-
sentially, they sought an order requiring the federal government to unearth 
from federal land the remains of Geronimo to prove that the remains were in-
tact and an order requiring the Skull and Bones Society to return any remains 
of Geronimo they might have in their possession. The court held that the provi-
sions of NAGPRA did not apply to the requested order for disinterment be-
cause the inventory requirements of NAGPRA do not apply to gravesites. In-
terestingly, there is no discussion in the opinion regarding the second claim 
against the Skull and Bones Society and Yale. This is likely because the 
NAGPRA provisions do not apply to the privately-run Skull and Bones Socie-
ty. It is also significant to note, however, that the plaintiffs did not attempt to 
make any assertions relying upon common law and statutory provisions. This 
is because the existing non-property and quasi-property provisions are not par-
ticularly powerful, nor are they easily applicable to long-dead remains. 
3. Other Legal Difficulties for Long-Dead Remains 
Often, long-dead remains can only be identified on a group, rather than 
individual, level. This means they are largely unprotected under both quasi-
property and other common law actions and statutes.249 Significantly, long-
dead remains are also not well suited to mental distress actions. Mental distress 
actions are often a last resort claim by families that enables retribution for the 
expropriation or damage of human remains. Given the inefficiency and ambi-
guity of the protections of human remains described above, particularly regard-
ing monetary compensation, a number of judges have relied upon mental dis-
tress claims to provide damages to family members. One of the most macabre 
examples of this is the case of Lott v. State.250 On a fateful day in 1962, Mrs. 
Lott, an Orthodox Jew, and Mrs. Tumminelli, a Roman Catholic, died at about 
the same hour in Brooklyn State Hospital. Unfortunately, the bodies of the two 
women were transposed in the hospital morgue. The result was that the body of 
Mrs. Lott, in the possession of the Tumminelli funeral director, was embalmed, 
made up with cosmetics, and placed in a coffin with a crucifix and rosary 
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beads in her hands in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic faith. 
Mrs. Tumminelli was prepared for an Orthodox Jewish burial with the requi-
site preparations and readings from the Torah. Shortly thereafter, the Lott fami-
ly went to the funeral home to pay their final respects to Mrs. Lott, only to dis-
cover that the body that lay before them was not the body of their dearly de-
parted. Needless to say, neither family was pleased. The court agreed that the 
“temporary deprivation of the right to the bodies . . . the unauthorized embalm-
ing of the body of Rose Lott and the resultant mental suffering of the claimants 
as next of kin are wrongs for which the defendant is liable [for $1,000].”251 
This case does not conform to many of the standard requirements of a mental 
distress action, and yet it is intuitively understandable why the judge allowed a 
distress claim. Furthermore, mental distress actions often enable judges to 
avoid the thornier issue of ascribing a monetary value to a damaged corpse. 
This will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
In addition to providing moral redress, from a law and economics per-
spective, enabling mental distress actions in instances such as the Lott case 
creates a desirable incentive for morgues to invest in procedures that correctly 
identify remains. Nonetheless, rulings are split, and many judges refuse to rec-
ognize mental distress claims, a decision that frequently leaves families with 
no other avenue to recover damages given the relatively limited scope of exist-
ing legal protections.252 What is clear, however, is that mental distress claims 
are generally limited to next of kin. For instance, in Massaro v. Charles J. 
O’Shea Funeral Home, the court recognized that the son of a decedent could 
recover damages for emotional distress, but it held that a grandchild who had 
witnessed the same disturbance of the corpse could not recover because he was 
not the next of kin.253 Thus, the limited legal avenues for the living to control 
and protect the physical bodies of their dead are largely reserved for recently 
deceased remains and very close family members. As we saw with cemetery 
protections, these provisions, therefore, are not particularly applicable to older 
and unidentifiable Native American remains that were collected and retained 
over the last two centuries. As a result, despite the general legislative and judicial 
trend toward protecting Native American burial grounds, applying criminal legal 
provisions to Native American burial grounds and remains, and recognizing non-
property interests, which culminated in NAGPRA, these measures are not par-
ticularly well-suited for addressing the past injustices of the robbing of Native 
American graves or determining disposition of long-dead remains. 
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E. Non-Property of Non-Native Remains and the Property  
Status of Native American Remains 
Property represents a final avenue for exerting rights to protect, repossess, 
and control human remains that exists independently from the constraints dis-
cussed above. Under traditional common law, however, human bodies and 
parts cannot be objects of property. Lord Coke, for instance, noted that corpses 
under the common law were “nullius in bonis,” or the property of no one.254 
English and American courts “took Coke at his word, often literally repeating 
his account such that the common law has come to accept, albeit largely 
though obiter dicta, that, buried or not, and rightly or wrongly, the dead human 
body is the subject to this so-called ‘no-property rule.’”255 The rule that re-
mains cannot be property has implications for a wide range of legal actions 
ranging from theft to recovery for damages. As noted by Blackstone, the 
“stealing the corpse itself, which has no owner, (though a matter of great inde-
cency) is no felony, unless some of the graveclothes be stolen with it.”256 Con-
sequently, in the 1788 English case of R v. Lynn, the court relied upon Black-
stone’s determination and held that an individual could not be indicted for theft 
of a human corpse.257 Similarly, in Meagher v. Driscoll, mentioned earlier, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that at common law, “[a] dead 
body is not the subject of property”258 In modern American courts, the proposi-
tion that human bodies cannot be property has by-and-large remained intact.259 
Although the refusal to recognize corpses as property is grounded in notions of 
respect and sanctity of the dead, the legal implications of this refusal has often 
resulted in grave injustices that lacked legal remedy. This accounts for the pro-
liferation and importance of statutes protecting cemeteries and outlawing grave 
robbing described in the previous sub-sections. 
1. The Evolving Property Status of Native American Remains 
a. Individual Property of Non-Natives 
One major exception in American law to the no-property status of human 
corpses is the statutory treatment of Native American remains as property. 
Through sequential federal legislation, Native American remains have been 
legally transformed in America from private property, to government property, 
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and then to private or communal property. Despite an inability to locate an ear-
ly American case wherein Native American remains are recognized as private 
property, through a conversion action, for instance, the history described in 
Part I suggests that if part of Samuel Morton’s skull collection had been stolen 
or damaged, he would have likely succeeded in a private property-based claim 
for restitution. 
b. Property of the Federal Government 
As briefly mentioned in Part III above, the United States government took 
an interest at the turn of the twentieth century in protecting the graves of Na-
tive Americans from grave robbers and looters. The Antiquities Act of 1906 
was passed in part to address the destruction and looting of Native American 
sites.260 The Antiquities Act serves to protect and preserve the United States’ 
environment and heritage.261 In addition to protecting Native American burial 
sites, the Antiquities Act has been utilized to protect particular graves and non-
Native burial grounds. In 1925, the grave of the explorer Meriwether Lewis 
was declared a national monument,262 and in 2006, a New York City burial 
ground utilized by African-American slaves was similarly protected under 
President Bush’s order.263 What is notable about the Antiquities Act in the con-
text of this work is that the 1906 version stipulated that Native American re-
mains discovered on federal lands were classified as “objects of antiquity.”264 
This classification also encompassed more traditionally recognized property 
objects, including masks, baskets, and pottery. The Antiquities Act protected 
remains and artifacts in a single stroke by labeling them as antiquities that are 
the property of the government. The significance of this label as objects of an-
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tiquity, and therefore, objects of property, has gone unnoticed in the existing 
literature. On one hand, it was very logical for Congress to address antiquities 
and remains simultaneously, given that remains and antiquities are often dis-
covered and traded together. On the other hand, this simultaneous regulation is 
fundamentally different from the separate regulation of other non-Native re-
mains and non-Native artifacts. Under the Antiquities Act, Native American 
remains were the property of the federal government. Given the history of de-
humanization and commercialization discussed in Part I, the Antiquities Act 
likely reflected an existing bias that Native remains were property objects kin-
dred to other tradable commodities. 
The Antiquities Act was in effect for seventy years before it encountered 
legal difficulty. It included punitive provisions for those caught violating it; 
any person who illegally took or destroyed an object of antiquity that was lo-
cated on government lands could be fined up to 500 dollars and or imprisoned 
up to ninety days.265 In 1974, in United States v. Diaz, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the punitive provision of the Antiquities Act was, “fatally 
vague in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.”266 In Diaz, 
the government sought to enforce the punitive provisions of the Antiquities Act 
against Diaz for the expropriation of Native American face masks that were 
only three or four years old. The court felt that the Antiquities Act failed to 
adequately define “antiquities,” especially with regards to age, and it expressed 
concern that “[h]obbyists who explore the desert and its ghost towns for ar-
rowheads and antique bottles could arguably find themselves within the Act’s 
proscriptions.”267 
The vacating of the original punitive provisions of the Antiquities Act led 
other courts to consider whether the government could still convict expropria-
tors of Native American antiquities of theft. The same year as Diaz, in United 
States v. Jones, the defendants were charged with “wilfully [sic] and knowing-
ly [stealing] Indian artifacts consisting of clay pots, bone awls, stone metates 
and human skeletal remains, of a value in excess of $100.”268 The lower court 
held that, by the passage of the Antiquities Act, Congress intended to limit the 
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application of general theft statutes. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, rejected this approach and held that, despite their ruling in Diaz, “[t]here 
can be little doubt that the ruins located in the Tonto National Forest and the 
relics found on the ruins are the property of the United States government.”269 
The defendants could therefore be charged with theft. 
At first glance, Jones does not appear to be a particularly important deci-
sion. In fact, it has received, little, if no, commentary in the literature of human 
remains. To overlook Jones, however, is a mistake. In Jones, the human skele-
tal remains are explicitly included in the list of property objects that the de-
fendants were charged with stealing under the criminal statute against theft. As 
discussed above, at common law, human corpses were not considered property 
objects, and the taking of human remains was not actionable under theft.270 
Even today, most states do not allow theft of human remains as a viable ac-
tion.271 Most states currently proscribe stealing human bodies and parts 
through the public health sections of their codes. For example, New York’s 
public health law includes a provision making it a class D felony to “steal” 
bodies.272 Despite the rhetoric of “stealing,” the provision falls under the regu-
lation of cadavers in a manner that distinguishes the action from traditional 
theft of property. 
While we can, and should, be condemnatory of the disparate historical 
treatment and conception of Native American remains, I suggest that we 
should not be as condemnatory of the decision in Jones. The fact pattern of 
Jones makes it quite clear that the defendants were wrongfully looting Native 
American graves, and the judges exhibited a clear desire to protect the remains 
and artifacts. As shall be discussed in Part V, labeling human remains as very 
limited property of the government or another enduring entity, such as a tribe, 
may be a desirably expedient way of enabling the reclamation of looted re-
mains. In fact, there are examples where judges have labeled non-Native re-
mains as property in order to enable a conviction for a morally wrongful act that 
would otherwise be technically legally. For instance, in 1891, in Larson v. 
Chase,273 the court articulated a property status rule for human remains in order 
to enable recovery for the wrongful dissection of the plaintiff’s deceased loved 
one. In the opinion, the judge recognized the no-property rule, but stated that: 
                                                                                                                           
 269 Id. at 272. 
 270 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 256, at *236. 
 271 New Jersey is an outlier because it details that the theft of human remains shall constitute 
second-degree theft. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2 (2013). 
 272 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4216 (McKinney 2010). 
 273 Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238–39 (Minn. 1891). 
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[I]t would be a reproach to the law if a plaintiff’s right to recover for 
mental anguish resulting from the mutilation or other disturbance of 
the remains of his dead should be made to depend upon whether in 
committing the act the defendant also committed a technical trespass 
upon plaintiff’s premises, while everybody’s common sense would 
tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass on 
the land, but the indignity to the dead.274  
Therefore, he held that:  
Those who are entitled to possession and custody of it for purposes 
of decent burial have certain legal rights to and in it which the law 
recognizes and will protect. . . . [This] leads necessarily to the con-
clusion that it is his property in the broadest and most general sense 
of the term, viz., something over which the law accords him exclu-
sive control.275  
Larson, however, is by and large an outlier in American case law.276 Unfortu-
nately for the writers of the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the judges in Jones, it 
is unlikely that the same level of sentimental protection of the next of kin and 
the deceased in operation in Larson was the justification behind the assignment 
and confirmation of Native American remains as property in the early 1900s. 
There is very little case law following Diaz and Jones, but the time win-
dow between the invalidation of the Antiquities Act’s penal provisions by the 
Ninth Circuit and the promulgation of the Archaeological Resources Protection 
Act of 1979 (“ARPA”) confirms the assertion that Native American remains 
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 276 Regents v. Kelly is an interesting example of an English case. See [1999] QB 621 (Eng.). An-
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been prompted to hold that corpses are legal property. See Larson, 50 N.W. at 240; Bogert v. City of 
Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 120, 123 (1859).  
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were considered legal objects of property in a manner distinct from non-Native 
human remains under the common law. Under ARPA, Native American re-
mains were reclassified from “objects of antiquity” to “archaeological re-
sources.”277 Such resources “remain the property of the United States” even 
after they have been removed from federal lands.278  
c. Individual and Communal Property Under NAGPRA 
The historical distinction of remains as property was perpetuated with the 
passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(“NAGPRA”) in 1990. As discussed in Part III, human remains are classified 
as property under NAGPRA. The implications of Native American remains’ 
continued distinction as property objects are dramatically different from earlier 
property statuses because ownership rights are vested with individual descend-
ants and tribes. Section 3002 states, “Native American human remains and ob-
jects[:] The ownership or control of Native American cultural items . . . shall 
be . . . [granted in the following order].”279 Rights over human remains, under 
NAGPRA, are first granted to lineal descendants. If no lineal descendants can 
be established, then, under NAGPRA, authority is vested with identifiable 
tribes.280 Once a claim has been established, individuals and tribes under Sec-
tion 3005 have the right to demand the return of those remains held by federal 
institutions. 
The continued classification of Native American remains as individual 
and communal property, even as limited property, perpetuates the significantly 
different status and treatment of Native American remains under American 
law.281 Native American remains have been uniquely carved out and specifical-
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ly labeled as property objects by federal legislation. The conception of ancient 
human remains as owned property will be more fully explored in Part V, but 
the purpose of this property sub-section has been to show that the general trend 
in American law is that human remains, particularly corpses and bones rather 
than bodily products, have been and continue to be classified as non-property 
objects, whereas Native American remains were historically carved out as 
property. This distinction persists under NAGPRA. Therefore, NAGPRA does 
more than recognize individual and communal rights of disposition and burial 
over Native American remains to tribes; it also, under § 3002, recognizes lim-
ited individual and communal property rights. 
In this fourth Part on the status, treatment, and protection of human re-
mains, five important areas of law that enable the protection of human remains 
have been discussed: (1) state protection of burial grounds, (2) federal protec-
tion for burial grounds, (3) criminal laws, (4) non-property interests, and (5) 
property interests. In each area, it has been shown that Native American re-
mains have historically been treated dramatically differently from the majority 
of human remains. With the passage of NAGPRA and parallel state efforts, 
many of these distinctions, such as those between cemeteries and burial 
grounds, were removed. One area, however, where a substantial and question-
able distinction persists is in the recognition of older Native American remains 
as individual and communal property under NAGPRA. Examination in Part V 
of property status and communal property, however, suggests that any concerns 
about property status are misguided. Despite the fact that NAGPRA has resulted 
in statutory protections for Native burial grounds and remains that are stronger 
than existing common law and statutory protections for non-Native remains, pro-
tections for burial grounds, criminal statutes, and non-property interests do not 
substantively apply to older unburied remains. As we shall see in Part V, proper-
ty is therefore a particularly empowering legal signal and tool for Native Ameri-
cans to assert rights of possession and disposition over their dead. 
V. EXPLORING PROPERTY 
As discussed in Part III, the two unique elements of the legal status of Na-
tive American remains are that they can be considered both individual and 
communal property. American law has tended to uphold a system whereby 
human remains are not considered property and rights of possession are grant-
ed to an individual. At first inspection, it might seem that the property-based 
approach to Native American remains should be vehemently argued against. 
This is understandable given the historical treatment of Native American re-
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mains as commodities, and the association between property and commerce. 
Exploration of the current formulation of the law as discussed in the above 
sections, however, suggests that the current framework under NAGPRA ena-
bles Native Americans to protect and control the remains of their dead more 
effectively than other groups. Two questions must be addressed first: (1) 
whether there is something inherently incompatible about labeling human re-
mains as property; and (2) whether a communally based system is appropriate. 
It will be shown that in both instances there are benefits to the current owner-
ship provisions of NAGPRA. Given these benefits, there would be similar ad-
vantages to applying communal property status more broadly to other human 
remains, particularly older remains. 
A. Appropriateness of Property Status 
The rationale underlying the common law no-property rule is readily ap-
parent. Judges and laity both exhibit deep misgivings about attaching property 
status to the remains of deceased loved ones. This is in large part because the 
notion of property is, for most people, inextricably linked with commercializa-
tion and the right to sell. Whether human body parts can or should be sold is a 
separate discussion that need not be answered within the context of this Arti-
cle’s discussion of NAGPRA. It is worth noting that in the context of 
NAGPRA, the law only prohibits illegal trafficking, defined as “knowingly 
sell[ing], purchas[ing], use[ing] for profit, or transport[ing] for sale or profit, 
the human remains of a Native American without the right of possession to 
those remains as provided in [NAGPRA].”282 If human remains were obtained 
with “full knowledge and consent[,]” then the ban on commercial traffic does 
not apply.283 Even if Congress were to ban all sales of Native American re-
mains, this would not bar property status.284 Despite a lay conception of prop-
erty as “sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other in-
dividual in the universe,”285 property as it exists within American law is far 
more multifaceted. Whether under a disagreeable Honorian bundle of rights 
view or a more essentialist conception of property, different formulations of 
rights and duties can apply to different objects and yet still be considered prop-
erty. 286 Significantly, a property right can be severely limited and need not in-
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clude the right to sale. Judge Mosk, in his dissent in Moore v. Regents, noted 
this in reference to human biological materials, stating that, “some types of 
personal property may be sold but not given away, while others may be given 
away but not sold, and still others may neither be given away nor sold.”287 The 
existence of limitations on use or sale does not, therefore, categorically prohib-
it property status.288 Even if limited in construct, property status is still entirely 
possible and congruent with prevailing theories of property. 
I also believe that while property status under the 1906 Antiquities Act 
was dehumanizing and reflected negative underlying beliefs about Native 
Americans, otherness, and commodification, under NAGPRA, property status 
mirrors many of the key values-based features of traditional non-property hu-
man remains law. First, individual and tribal property rights to human remains 
are limited in a manner that mirrors the common law and statutory regulation 
of rights of use and control over human remains. For instance, while individu-
als and tribes can relinquish their rights, it does not appear that they can trans-
fer them to another individual or tribe.289 If an individual or tribe relinquishes 
their rights, it appears that any pre-existing ownership claims by an institution 
will be recognized. The parallel to this with non-Native human remains is that 
if the next of kin fails to claim their deceased, the state retains the authority to 
determine disposition. Second, NAGPRA has not been interpreted by courts to 
provide for monetary damages. This reflects the common law refusal to recog-
nize any possible monetary damages, aside from emotional damages, resulting 
from the mutilation or destruction of a corpse.290 In Castro Romero v. Becken, 
the court held that NAGPRA should not be construed as “provid[ing] grounds 
for recovery of monetary damages for individuals who allege Native American 
ancestry.”291 Third, an argument can be made that NAGPRA reflects general 
understandings about the status of ancient remains. American case law and 
other nations’ statutory laws, such as Egypt’s,292 suggest that the older remains 
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are and the farther they evolve from identified individual subjects into uniden-
tified objects of display, the more willing we are, and should be, to recognize 
property status. Consequently, property status of Native American remains un-
der NAGPRA may have, unlike in the past, much less to do with their identity 
as Native American remains, and much more to do with other attributes such 
as age and the need to enable repatriation. These features of property status 
under NAGPRA demonstrate that it is possible to align property status with the 
core tenets of the underlying non-property and quasi-property human remains 
case law. 
There are many positive reasons to recognize Native American remains, 
particularly ancient displayed ones, as property:  
Because Native Americans had no property rights in the burial re-
mains of their people, they were unable to direct what happened . . . . 
NAGPRA has changed the legal landscape in this regard. . . . Thus, 
NAGPRA employs the language of property to facilitate the return of 
items typically thought to transcend property concepts.293  
The brutal history described in Part I makes clear that repatriation of remains 
and inclusion of Native Americans decision-making were required. While 
Congress could have chosen to only enact inventory and repatriation require-
ments for federally funded museums, they chose instead to include § 3002’s 
ownership provisions. This recognition is symbolically and legally significant 
because property rights, rather than a requirement to only repatriate, ensures 
that Native Americans’ voices have authority, and it broadens avenues for as-
serting claims in determining the treatment and disposition of Native American 
remains and artifacts. Consequently, whereas property status under the 1906 
Antiquities Act may have been representative of disempowerment of Native 
Americans, property status under NAGPRA is empowering. 
B. Communal Property 
Given the legal and normative acceptability of property status, we must 
also turn to the second unique feature under NAGPRA: communal property. 
The majority of property rights in America are understood as individually, ra-
ther than communally, based.294 Moreover, with human remains, the non-
property right to possession is an individual right typically conferred to the 
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next of kin of the deceased.295 Courts have focused on ranked order of deci-
sion-making authority for non-Native remains, typically starting with the sur-
viving spouse. Why then did Congress treat Native American remains differ-
ently by recognizing communal property rights? NAGPRA first recognizes the 
authority of lineal descendants, and, if there are none identifiable, tribal gov-
ernments. Thus, while in earlier sections of this Article I, for the sake of clarity, 
reference individual ownership under NAGPRA to distinguish it from tribal 
property, the language of NAGPRA suggests all ownership under the Act is 
better termed communal property. The Act contemplates and encourages com-
munal ownership, which deviates from the traditional regulation of non-Native 
remains. I think the communal property feature is the most powerful element 
of property status under NAGPRA. 
There are two particularly salient reasons why a communal, rights-based 
approach is appropriate and beneficial. First, human remains are inherently 
communal. Spouses, children, and parents are all interconnected in their rela-
tionships to a decedent. With older remains, it can become even more chal-
lenging to assign a singular claim holder. The suit to ascertain the status of Ge-
ronimo’s remains, for example, was filed by nineteen family members, includ-
ing several great-grandchildren.296 Second, there are realistic constraints raised 
by ancient remains such that an individual rights framework would be unwork-
able and prohibitively expensive. The individual identity of the remains may 
be difficult to ascertain, and even if known, proving a direct link to a modern 
descendant is cumbersome. Third, the communal and symbolic nature of hu-
man remains means that some groups of living people, not only Native Ameri-
can tribes, are often willing to take responsibility for the care of certain re-
mains. Instances such as these will rarely rise to the level of a positive claim, 
but they can lead to an appropriate delegation of responsibility. The case of the 
non-Native outlaw Elmer McCurdy, discussed above, is demonstrative of this 
type of delegation of authority. The Los Angeles Coroner’s office held 
McCurdy’s remains after they were identified. A living relative could not be 
located. The remains were ultimately released to the custody of the Oklahoma 
chapter of Westerners International, a western cowboy organization, which 
petitioned to repatriate and inter the remains back to Oklahoma.297  
NAGPRA’s recognition of communal tribal property of human remains is 
consistent with other aspects of Native American law. In many areas, American 
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law recognizes privileges, rights, and powers of tribes. One of the most relevant 
examples is that of adoption placement of Native American children. Under 25 
U.S.C. § 1915(c), a tribe can petition to alter the adoption placement of a child 
who is a member of their tribe.298 For non-Native adoptions, the right to deter-
mine placement is reserved for parents, or a next of kin, and the government. 
Consequently, while the recognition of a tribal right to possession is unique with-
in the context of the law of human remains, it reflects a broader decision in 
American law to recognize the authority of tribes in a wide variety of matters. 
Aside from legal congruency of recognition and respect for tribal deci-
sion-making in America, there are more fundamental reasons to adopt tribal 
communal property rights or control over Native American remains. In fact, it 
arguably makes more normative sense to follow a communal, rather than an 
individual, model with human remains. Human remains are unique objects be-
cause many people, family, and friends form interconnected webs of meaning 
and personal identity around them. While relevant connections are more likely 
with the remains of the recently deceased, they are also possible with the re-
mains of the long dead, particularly if they can be identified as members of a 
tribe. Margaret Radin’s personhood theory of property sheds light on which 
connections and interests we might want a legal system to respect, and it artic-
ulates a framework as to why we should recognize rights for tribes, not just 
individuals, over long dead and unidentifiable remains.299 Arguably, the legal 
system has adopted an individual rights framework instead of a communal 
framework for human remains, as it also has with consent for medical treat-
ment for incompetent patients,300 to avoid conflict and indecision.301 With long 
dead tribal remains, there is significantly less risk of conflict with communal 
members given an established tribal structure and singular religious practices.302 
More broadly, human remains may be best understood as cultural proper-
ty, which is inherently communal.303 Cultural property can be defined as an 
object that describes the reality of a society in a distinctive way. In fact, “[i]t 
provides the underpinning of group identity in a spatial and temporal con-
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text.”304 Cultural property objects also have intrinsic value to the group, “such 
that . . . loss, destruction, sale, or improper use by outsiders harms the group in 
a way that is not monetarily compensable.”305 Moreover, there is the funda-
mental notion that this symbolism justifies creating a category of property that 
“promotes grouphood.”306 The vast majority of human remains will never ac-
quire this heightened degree of cultural symbolism, but there is good reason to 
think of collected and displayed Native American remains as tribal cultural 
property. As the legislative history of NAGPRA shows, modern American trib-
al groups are keenly aware and pained by the history of grave robbing and arti-
fact looting.307 Even a single tribal member’s collected remains can be deeply 
symbolic for that entire tribal group.308 Therefore, by enabling the recognition 
of the human remains that fall under its remit as communal property, 
NAGPRA is able to fulfill its purpose of protecting objects that have “ongoing 
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American 
group or culture itself.”309 
Communal property rights are additionally desirable because they enable 
the government to effectively accomplish the goal of repatriation without un-
dertaking significantly more expensive and impractical investigation to locate 
descendants. As Carol Rose notes, “[c]ommon property is a kind of property 
system that often emerges when it is impractical or expensive to have individ-
ualized property in a given resource.”310 While the use of modern DNA testing 
means it is technically possible that we could identify descendants of Native 
American remains, it would be highly expensive and impractical. Thus, it 
would often prove impossible. Tribal identification through archaeology is 
substantially cheaper than DNA identification, and allocation of rights to tribes 
has proven to be acceptable to Native peoples and society at large. Further-
more, recognition of communal rights enables the government to accomplish 
one of the goals of NAGPRA: providing redress for hundreds of years of gov-
ernmental control over Native American remains and demonstrating respect for 
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Native American religious and burial practices. Under the existing law, when 
the next of kin of non-Native human remains are unidentifiable, the state is 
granted the authority to possess and determine disposition. The current practice 
in many states whereby unidentified remains can be donated by the state to 
medical schools is a prime example.311 Similarly, under NAGPRA, the federal 
government, and its institutions, retain control over remains whose tribal iden-
tity cannot be established. Expanded recognition from next of kin to tribal 
rights ensures the return of greater numbers of remains. Beyond the practical 
concerns of identification, there is also a high risk that even if descendants 
could be identified, they might have little interest or resources to act upon a 
recognizable claim. Tribes represent an enduring entity that can be entrusted to 
look after the remains in a manner that mirrors the rationale for recognizing the 
role of the next of kin with all human remains cases. Significantly, tribes, 
compared to individuals, are hopefully better situated to have the financial and 
legal resources to pursue claims for repatriation and perform reburial ceremo-
nies.312 
Furthermore, communal tribal rights for older remains do not raise two of 
the typical concerns against communal ownership: squandered resources and 
conflicts over disposition.313 Squandering resources, a frequent critique of com-
munal property, has little application to most Native American remains covered 
by NAGPRA. They are older remains that have no medical application and are 
typically no longer considered valuable archaeologically. Society does have an 
interest in ensuring the production of knowledge through archaeology. But, as 
was noted in the congressional NAGPRA hearings, the vast majority of Native 
remains held in federal collections no longer play a particularly important role in 
research programs. The remains that are of interest are so ancient that they typi-
cally fall outside of the parameters of NAGPRA tribal affiliation requirements. 
Such was the case with the 9000-year-old remains of the Kennewick man.314 For 
the majority of Native American remains that are held in collections and can be 
identified as being affiliated with an individual tribe, conflicts of interest are 
minimal. The tribal governments and their NAGPRA repatriation committees 
have mechanisms in place for determining disposition after repatriation. Tribes 
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are therefore more appropriate actors than the government and will often be the 
only possible, or willing, custodian. 
Although tribes should be open to the individual and communal property 
status created under the Act, two recommendations can be made. First, while it is 
technically workable to have human remains and cultural items, such as pottery 
and other man-made objects, regulated together, Congress should separate them 
under the legislation. Human remains raise particular issues and concerns that 
are best addressed separately. This is the model followed by states’ regulation of 
non-Native remains, and it should be applied by the federal government under 
NAGPRA along with the state regulations, which model the provisions of 
NAGPRA. Second, courts have clarified some of the limitations and applicabil-
ity of NAGPRA. Most significantly, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Cha-
con asserted that NAGPRA does not apply to recently deceased remains.315 Fur-
ther clarification, however, is required to articulate the class of remains to which 
the Act applies and the extent and nature of the resulting property rights. In par-
ticular, while communal property is a desirable methodology, clarification is 
needed pertaining to the duties and constraints of tribes regarding communally 
owned human remains. Notably, it is currently unclear if it is permissible to sell 
Native American remains covered by the Act if there is valid possession and ti-
tle. Of continued concern within the law is that ambiguity over sales is not unu-
sual within human regulations more broadly. As discussed above, the sale of 
human remains outside the context of organ transplantation is not formally regu-
lated. 
Despite these recommendations, the property status and the communal 
rights-based approach embodied by NAGPRA are worth further analysis regard-
ing the potential for broader application to human remains regulation, especially 
in the case of long dead remains. There are other communities of Americans 
who have struggled to protect older cemeteries and remains. Long dead remains 
that are unidentifiable at the individual level are discovered at regular intervals 
over the course of many construction projects. Often, archaeologists can identify 
remains on a group level. Most notably, numerous slave cemeteries have been 
identified from New York to Virginia. Lawsuits have arisen as African-American 
community members seek to protect remains in rare cases, but they fail because 
the claimants do not have standing without proof of direct descent.316 Especially 
                                                                                                                           
 315 Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644, 646 (W.D. Tex. 1999).  
 316 A lack of proof regarding descent appeared, for example, to be one of the main issues in a 
Richmond, Virginia case involving a slave burial ground. The complaint was dismissed. Mai-Linh K. 
Hong, “Get Your Asphalt Off My Ancestors!”: Reclaiming Richmond’s African Burial Ground, 13 
LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 81, 83 (2017) (citing El-Amin v. Kilpatrick, No. CL1-67-00, slip op., (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2010)). 
2408 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2347 
in instances such as these, a communal property type model would prove a pow-
erful tool to effectuate living populations’ interests in protecting human remains. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s examination reveals that Native American remains are 
uniquely classified as objects of legal property. Historically, Native American 
remains were treated as individual and then federal government property. In 
sharp contrast, non-Native human remains have typically been classified as non-
property objects. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
was a significant step forward in providing for the honor, protection, and repatri-
ation of Native American remains. Yet, while NAGPRA removed the categorical 
status of government property, it still perpetuated this unique property status. 
Under the Act, Native American remains can become the legal property of lineal 
descendants or tribal governments. While at first glance NAGPRA’s perpetua-
tion of difference and property status is alarming, I argue that there are strong 
legal, normative, and efficiency benefits of property status. Crucially, the proper-
ty perpetuated under NAGPRA is inherently communal. Communal property 
status of human remains confers desirable advantages and better represents the 
unique symbolic status of human remains compared to traditional human re-
mains law in the United States. I believe the approach advanced by the Act is 
therefore ripe for further examination and application to human remains law 
more broadly. 
